Auditing Technology for Electronic Voting Machines by Cohen, Sharon B.
  
 
CALTECH/MIT 
VOTING TECHNOLOGY PROJECT 
A multi-disciplinary, collaborative project of 
the California Institute of Technology – Pasadena, California 91125 and 
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology – Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AUDITING TECHNOLOGY FOR ELECTRONIC VOTING MACHINES 
 
 
 
Sharon B. Cohen 
MIT 
 
 
Key words: DRE, voting machine security, electronic voting, electronic voting 
machines, auditing technology 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VTP WORKING PAPER #46 
May 2005 
 
Auditing Technology for Electronic Voting 
Machines 
 
by 
Sharon B. Cohen 
 
Submitted to the Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science  
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degrees of  
Bachelor of Science in Computer Science and Engineering  
and Master of Engineering in Electrical Engineering and Computer Science  
at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
May 19, 2005  
Copyright 2005 Sharon B. Cohen. All rights reserved.  
 
The author hereby grants to M.I.T. permission to reproduce and 
distribute publicly paper and electronic copies of this thesis 
and to grant others the right to do so. 
 
 
Author_________________________________________________________________ 
        Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science 
                                                          May 19, 2005 
 
Certified by___________________________________________________________ 
                                                             Ted Selker  
                                                      Thesis Supervisor 
 
Accepted by____________________________________________________________ 
                                                        Arthur C. Smith 
                      Chairman, Department Committee on Graduate Theses 
 
 
 2 
Auditing Technology for Electronic Voting 
Machines 
 
by 
Sharon B. Cohen 
 
Submitted to the 
Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science 
May 19, 2005  
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of 
Bachelor of Science in Computer Science and Engineering 
and Master of Engineering in Electrical Engineering and Computer Science 
ABSTRACT 
Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) voting machine security has been a significant 
topic of contention ever since Diebold voting machine code turned up on a public internet 
site in 2003 and computer scientists at Johns Hopkins University declared the machine 
“unsuitable for use in a general election.”  Since then, many people from computer 
scientists to politicians have begun to insist that DREs be equipped with a paper trail.  A 
paper trail provides a paper printout for the voter to approve at the end of each voting 
session.  Although there have been strong political efforts to place paper trails on DRE 
machines, there have not been any scientific studies to indicate that paper trails are 
effective audits.  This work describes a user study done to compare paper trails to audio 
audits, a new proposal for DRE auditing.  Participants in the study completed four 
elections on a voting machine with a paper trail and four elections on a machine with an 
audio trail.  There were purposeful mistakes inserted into the audits on some of the 
machines.  Results from the study indicated that participants were able to find almost 10 
times as many errors in the audio audit then they were able to find in the paper trail.  
Voters’ attitudes towards the paper audit were extremely apathetic, and voters did not 
spend much time reviewing their paper record.  When asked which type of audit voters 
would prefer for their own county elections, almost all voters preferred the VVPAT.  
These results indicate that newer alternative audit technology holds great promise in 
delivering a safe and accurate audit and further that paper trails have some significant 
design obstacles that need to be overcome before they will be effective audits. 
 
Thesis Supervisor: Ted Selker 
Title: Associate Professor, Program in Media Arts and Sciences 
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I. Introduction 
 Voting is one of the most important responsibilities provided to us by the United 
States Constitution.  Every American citizen above the age of 18 is afforded this right.  
Although currently the right to vote is restricted only on the basis of citizenship, it was 
not always so; many people spent their entire lives working to gain this right.  While the 
success of previous generations struggles has quelled the controversy of who can vote, 
the presidential election of 2000 and the Florida hanging chad problem has opened a new 
era of election controversy.   
Every aspect of the voting process has been subjected to significant scrutiny.  
Scientists, politicians and even regular citizens have begun to re-evaluate the entire 
voting process, from voter registration and election officials, to polling locations, 
absentee voting, and finally voting technology, the equipment we use to collect and count 
the votes.  This evaluation has brought many changes and recommendations to our voting 
process.  Older technologies, including lever and punch card machines have been 
invalidated as proper voting devices, while newer electronic technologies have been 
hailed as the way of the future that will make voting an even more democratic process as 
disabled and impaired voters are able to vote independently. 
While direct recording electronic (DRE) voting machines hold a significant 
amount of promise in bringing an independent vote to millions of people who never had 
that opportunity previously, there have also been some serious concerns raised recently 
over the security of these machines.  Modern computer technology has brought many 
conveniences and comforts to our lives.  Our world today is vastly different from just a 
few years ago.  Computers run many critical systems from banking to flight control, 
however, many people still view computers as a black box.  There is very little 
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understand or oversight of what happens inside the computer.  Given this black box 
viewpoint, people have been questioning whether it is wise to allow DRE machines to 
count our votes.  Since the opportunity for a recount is limited with DRE technology, 
audit trails have become a source of controversy.  An audit trail is a separate technology 
that may be added to a voting machine and will result in an independent record and 
count, or at least ability to re-count, the votes.   
Currently, the most popular implemented and certified audit mechanism is the 
paper trail.  To create a paper trail audit a small printer must be attached to each voting 
machine.  After the voter finishes making their selections on the DRE, a printout appears 
of the vote which the voter then approves.  While there are a few other available audit 
technologies, for the most part, the audit trail debate has centered on printer trails.  The 
debate has become highly political.  Citizen groups have been formed specifically to 
force counties to add printers to their DRE machines.  Lawsuits were filed prior to the 
November 2004 elections asking that election officials be forced to provide paper voting 
options to voters.  Now there are laws being enacted that will require printer trails to be 
added to electronic voting machines. 
 While the calls for printer trails have gotten louder and more political, very few 
people have taken the time to step back and question how effective printer trials are at 
providing a secure audit of an election.  Ted Selker, of the MIT Media lab has proposed a 
new idea for an audio audit.  His proposal for a Voter Verified Audio Audit Transcript 
Trail (VVAATT) would work similar to the printer trail except that the audit created 
would be in an audio form instead of paper.   
My thesis project has been an investigation of voting audit technology through 
both qualitative comparisons and through an extensive user study comparing VVAATT 
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to the paper trail.  The user study measured general satisfaction and usability criteria 
associated with each system and also measured voters’ ability to find errors in the audit 
trails, a fundamental characteristic of how well the system can serve as an audit. 
 
II. Background: Electronic Voting and Audit Trails 
 Although the publicity and controversy surrounding DRE voting machines 
increased significantly following the 2000 presidential election, DRE machines were 
being developed and used long beforehand.  The first DRE machines were actually 
deployed in the 1970’s and strongly resembled lever machines; the levers were replaced 
by buttons.  The use of DREs grew very slowly before the 2000 election.  In 1980, less 
than one percent of registered voters were voting on DRE machines.  Over the next 
fourteen years, from 1980 to 1994, the use of DREs grew to five percent of registered 
voters.  DRE market growth was clearly taking off as their market share doubled from 
about five percent of voters to ten percent in the next four years, 1994 to 1998.  Below, in 
Figure 1 is a graph showing the market share of various voting technologies between 
1980 and 2004.  The influence of the 2000 presidential election is fairly easy to spot in 
the graph.  Between 2000 and 2002, the use of DREs nearly doubled from thirteen 
percent to twenty-three percent. [1]    
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Figure 1: Graph showing the percentage of registered voters using various kinds of voting 
technology. [1] 
 
At the same time that DREs were gaining market share, the market share of lever and 
punchcard machines was significantly decreasing.  The Help America Vote Act (HAVA) 
[2] of 2002 set specific technology and accessibility requirements for voting machines.  
HAVA specifically de-certified punchcard and lever machines for failing to provide a 
reliable voting system and because both systems are inaccessible to people with 
impairments or disabilities.  All states were mandated to replace punchcard and lever 
voting machines in time for the November 2004 election and funds were provided to 
facilitate such replacements. [2]     
 In January 2003, the controversy over the security of voting machines erupted 
with the discovery of Diebold voting machine source code on an unsecured internet site.  
The fact that the source code was unsecured was contentious enough, however, the real 
problems started for DRE machines with the release of Dr. Avi Ruben’s report on the 
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code[3].  Ruben and other researchers at Johns Hopkins University analyzed the Diebold 
source code and published a report on the security vulnerabilities of voting machines.  
This report forced many people to rethink their trust in voting machines and even 
prompted election officials in Maryland to conduct a separate review of their Diebold 
machines. [4]  Ruben’s report declared the Diebold machine “unsuitable for use in a 
general election” and further declared that “any paperless electronic voting system might 
suffer similar flaws, despite any "certification" it could have otherwise received.” [3]  As 
voting machines have been put under more and more scrutiny, many more people have 
begun to insist that a paper trail is necessary for all DRE voting machines.  Quite a few 
political action groups have been founded with the goal of forcing all DRE machines to 
be equipped with printer trails.  The most vocal of these groups is the Verified Voting 
Foundation. 
 Prior to the November 2004 election, there were lawsuits filed in several states 
which attempted to force the states to give voters an option of voting on paper if they did 
not wish to use DRE machines.  A group of seven people in Maryland sued the election 
commission in an attempt to force the state to provide paper alternatives to the newly 
purchased Diebold DRE machines. [5]  A group in Florida sued the state alleging that the 
lack of paper printout on their DRE machines violated their right to a manual recount. [6]  
Ultimately both groups lost their cases and the elections were conducted with the DRE 
machines.   
Even with the November 2004 election over, the political maneuvering has not 
stopped.  Now there are laws being proposed and enacted which will require DRE 
machines to be equipped with printer trails before they can be used in elections.  This 
type of legislation has already been enacted in many states and is pending in many more.  
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(Legislation has been enacted in 17 states including Nevada and California, and is 
currently proposed in 19 more.) [7]  
 
III. Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail 
 The concept of a voter verified paper audit trail (VVPAT) predates the current 
controversy over DRE security.  Rebecca Mercuri first introduced the VVPAT in March 
1992 in her paper “Physical Verifiability of Computer Systems.” [8]  The idea behind the 
VVPAT is quite simple.   
1. The voter uses the DRE to record their choices.   
2. When they are finished recording their choices, they press a button on the DRE 
and a printout appears behind a glass panel. 
3. The voter reads over the printout in order to verify that their selections have been 
properly recorded on the paper. 
4. If the voter accepts the printout then the paper is deposited in a secured ballot box.  
Otherwise, if the voter rejects the printout, they begin voting again.  Rejected 
paper ballots are marked to indicate that they were rejected and are not deposited 
in the ballot box.      
 
 When Mercuri first proposed this system, no DRE supplier had implemented it.  
More than 10 years after the initial proposal, Avi Rubin’s report and increasing security 
concerns prompted commercial vendors to implement the VVPAT system.  Currently 
almost all commercial DRE vendors promote some kind of VVPAT implementation.  
While a majority of states using DRE machines currently do no use a paper trail, that 
trend may be changing.  In September 2004, the state of Nevada became the first state to 
Comment [SBC1]:  
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run an election with a paper trail.  Implementing and running an election with the 
VVPAT places new responsibilities on every person involved in the voting process; 
voters, poll workers and election officials. 
 
 
Figure 2: VVPAT illustration, originally published in IEEE [9]   
 
 Voters are responsible for checking the correctness of their paper ballot.  In order 
for VVPAT to serve as an effective and trustworthy audit mechanism, the voter must 
verify their paper ballot.  Mercuri herself emphasizes the difference between a voter 
verified audit trail and a voter verifiable audit trail. [8]  Merely adding the capability for 
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a voter to verify their vote is not sufficient for an audit trial.  The voter must actually take 
action and certify that the printout is correct. 
 Running an election with VVPAT places additional responsibilities on already 
overburdened poll workers.  In addition to setting up and maintaining the DRE machines, 
poll workers must also set up and maintain the printers.  New responsibilities for poll 
workers and election officials include: 
• Setting up the printers 
• Fixing the printers in the event of a paper jam or other technical difficulty (lack of 
ink, unclear printing, etc.) 
• Handle the concerns of voters who say the printout does not match their choices. 
• Safely transport the paper printouts to the central election headquarters. 
• Safely store the paper printouts for as long as election law requires 
These new responsibilities place additional demands on the poll workers and require an 
even more technical skill set than has been required in the past.  In addition, states are 
challenged to properly train poll workers in their new roles.   
 Performing an audit of the election using the paper receipts brings in another 
group of people and requires different responsibilities.  People performing an audit with 
the paper receipts must be able to accurately read and record the voter’s choices.  The 
new tally must then be accurately counted and compared with the tally that the DRE 
machines gave.  Although Mercuri has suggested that it would be possible to design a 
computer system to read and tally the paper records, to date there is no such system.
 While the VVPAT provides a good starting point for an audit trail, it faces some 
significant obstacles.  Two of the main obstacles that challenge the successful 
implementation of a VVPAT are the requirements placed on voters to actually verify 
 12 
their selection and the ability of poll workers and election officials to keep the paper 
receipts secure before, during, and after the elections.   
One of the key principles that the VVPAT relies on is the idea that voters actually 
check their paper ballots before submitting them.  However, a recent observation of an 
election using a VVPAT calls that concept into question.  Ted Selker recently published a 
paper, “Process can Improve Electronic Voting: A Case Study of an Election” [11], about 
the primary election he observed in Reno, Nevada September 7th, 2004.  This election 
was run with Sequoia DRE machines which used a VVPAT.  Several of his interactions 
with voters and poll workers indicated that many voters did not actually verify their paper 
receipt.  Some notable examples include:  
• “Before leaving, I asked one of the exiting first voters, “Did you notice a second 
display?” trying to get him to tell me about the paper trail behind the glass. 
“No….,” the man replied, “I just voted and reviewed my selections on the 
screen.” [11] 
• “However, in the course of the day, I saw no more than 3 people spend even five 
seconds viewing the printout.” [11] 
• “Many voters were disappointed that they did not get to keep their paper receipt. 
However, a poll worker noted, “People aren’t looking at the paper.” [11] 
If voters do not actually take the time to verify their paper receipts, then VVPAT cannot 
serve as a secure audit trail.  While many computer scientists feel strongly that an audit 
trail is necessary for the security of their vote, many voters do not understand this and 
may not recognize how the VVPAT actually helps secure their vote.   
Another major challenge in implementing a VVPAT election is the ability to keep 
the paper trail secure before, during and after the election.  There is a long history of 
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elections being rigged though ballot stuffing, ballot theft and general mishandling.  
Elections officials must be careful to implement policies and procedures which insure 
that VVPAT printers and paper depositories are treated with the same care and respect as 
a ballot box.  During Selker’s experience in Nevada, he observed a situation in which one 
of the VVPAT printers had jammed and a poll worker was attempting to fix it.  Though 
the poll worker did not have ill intentions, and did not intentionally jeopardize the 
security of the paper trail, in the course of fixing the jam she had to open the printer, cut 
out some of the receipts, reload the paper and stuff it all back in the box.   
 
 
Figure 3:  Poll Worker attempting to fix a jammed VVPAT printer.  [11] 
 
 In this situation, the poll worker could have easily placed extra ballots in the box or 
taken some that were already there.  Clearly, this would not be acceptable treatment for a 
normal ballot box; it should not have been acceptable treatment for the paper receipts 
either.   
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Though these are two main challenges to VVPAT elections there are others as 
well.  Other challenges include the cost of the printers (of the currently available systems, 
each printer costs about $1000), the disenfranchisement of blind and low vision voters, 
the questionable ability of voters to accurately check their receipts, and the extra time 
required of the voters. 
 
IV. Voter Verified Audio Audit Transcript Trail  
 The voter verified audio audit transcript trail (VVAATT) is a new idea for a 
cheaper and potentially more effective election audit tool.  Selker introduced VVAATT 
in his article “The Voter Verified Audio Audit Transcript Trail” [12] as well as his 
Scientific American article, “Fixing the Vote.” [13]  VVAATT is similar to the VVPAT 
in many ways but has some critical differences.  The procedure for a voter is as follows: 
1. The voter steps into the voting booth and puts on the provided headphones. 
2. The voter begins voting as normal. 
3. Each time the voter makes a selection, he hears a confirmation in the headphones.  
For example, when the voter selects candidate A, the DRE will say “selected 
candidate A”.  This audio confirmation will be heard for every important action 
that the voter takes including, selecting a candidate, unselecting a candidate, 
advancing races, and submitting the ballot. 
4. The DRE audio output is also passed to the VVAATT recording unit which 
records the voting session on some physical medium such as an audio cassette. 
5. At the end of the session the voter submits their ballot and leaves the voting 
booth. 
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One of the most important differences between VVAATT and VVPAT is the immediate 
verification that occurs with the VVAATT system, as opposed to the delayed verification 
that the voter does at the end of a VVPAT voting session.  As the voter presses candidate 
A, he verifies that the audit trail records candidate A.  There is no time delay between the 
voter’s selection and the verification of that selection.  The immediate verification will 
also help decrease accidental mistakes such as pressing an incorrect candidate.  (The 
same number of accidental mistakes will be made, however, it may be easier for the voter 
to notice the mistakes when they hear the audio verification for the incorrect candidate.) 
 
 
Figure 4: Illustration of VVAATT, originally published in Scientific American [13] 
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 Implementing an election with a VVAATT places slightly different stresses on 
the election system than the VVPAT does.  One of the first areas of concern for election 
officials, is the question of if their DRE voting machines can actually support the 
VVAATT system.  No DRE machine as it is currently built can automatically support 
VVAATT (except machines which are enabled for visually impaired voters.)  However, 
with only slight modifications, any DRE could support the system.  The DRE machines 
must support simultaneous visual and audio output.  Although VVAATT would work 
seamlessly with a visually impaired audio ballot, it would be impractical and unnecessary 
to force all voters to vote in this manner.  The audio output needed for the VVAATT 
system is significantly different and simplified from the audio of a visually impaired 
ballot.  Audio is only required at the major interaction points the voter has with the 
machine.  These include: selecting a candidate, deselecting a candidate, advancing races, 
and submitting the ballot. 
 VVAATT places only minimal requirements on voters.  The main requirement is 
simply that voters wear the headphones.  Without instruction or prompting, it is unlikely 
that many voters would wear the headphones, however, a few simple steps could 
drastically reduce this problem.  Simply placing informative posters around the polling 
locations reminding voters to wear their headphones would likely provide enough 
encouragement, however, poll workers could also be enlisted to encourage voters to wear 
the headphones.  With enough encouragement and voter education, voters would have no 
trouble understanding how wearing the headphones is in their best interests.     
 The additional poll worker responsibilities with the VVAATT system are similar 
to those of VVPAT system.  Poll workers are responsible for setting up and maintaining 
the audio VVAATT units, however, since VVAATT is much less expensive then 
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VVPAT, malfunctioning VVAATT units could be replaced by entirely new ones instead 
of having the poll worker try to fix the broken one.  Poll workers would still need to set 
up the tape recorders and maintain them throughout election day, however, the process 
would be easier to handle because of the simpler audio output attachments.  Anyone who 
has ever used a pair of headphones could easily manage to plug in and start the 
VVAATT.  Storing and transporting the audio tapes would be much easier than storing 
the paper receipts because there would be fewer audio tapes than paper receipts and in 
addition, tapes are a much more durable medium than paper.   
 Auditing the VVAATT “by hand” would be a tedious process, workers would 
have to listen to each vote.  As much as a minute or more per vote could be expected.  
There are however, many very reasonable possibilities for creating a software system to 
perform the tallying automatically.     
 There are several challenges that the VVAATT will have to overcome in order to 
be a fully successful audit trail.  Some major challenges include making the system as 
general as possible so that it can properly interact with multiple DRE systems, 
implementing the system without disenfranchising deaf voters, reducing the cost and 
amount of time needed to perform a hand audit, and convincing voters and experts that a 
good audit system does not have to be paper and does not have to be physically visible. 
 
V. What Makes a Good Audit System 
 Before it is possible to talk about comparing two different audit systems, one must 
decide on what basis to compare them, or more generally, what makes a good audit 
system.  Some important characteristics of audit systems have already been alluded to in 
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the previous descriptions of the VVAATT and VVPAT audits.  When judging an audit 
system, all the people involved in the voting process need to be considered.    
 At the top of the list of people to consider, is the voter.  Voters are the people who 
will be using and interacting with the system with the highest degree of frequency.  If the 
audit system fails to meet the voter’s needs, then it can not be considered an acceptable 
system.  Conveniently, the voter’s needs are actually easiest to articulate.  The voter 
wants to accurately and completely place their vote.  They want this process to be as 
efficient as possible.  In addition, voters want elections to be held with the highest 
integrity possible.  Audit systems should only increase the integrity of the election. 
 The amount of time a voter takes to place their vote is an important consideration 
for both voters and election officials.  The harder it is and longer it takes voters to place 
their vote, the less satisfied voters will be with the process.  It is also generally true that 
the more complicated the voting process becomes, the more problems that will arise and 
the less accurate voters will be.  If it takes voters a long time to cast their ballot, long 
lines could result at polling places.  Long lines are at best a minor inconvenience, but in 
the worst case, voters may decide not to wait around to cast their vote.  Long lines were a 
major problem during the November 2004 election.  In Ohio, some people reported 
having waited more than seven hours before they were able to vote.  [14]  These 
circumstances were mostly the result of having too few voting machines in the polling 
sites, however, similar problems could arise if voters were taking too long on the 
equipment.   
 In addition to time constraints, voters must be able to properly use any audit 
system in order for it to be valuable.  Some audit systems do not involve the voter at all.  
This is a great advantage because it means the usability of the system depends only on the 
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usability of the DRE.  (The usability of the DRE is a major concern which should not be 
overlooked, however, this concern is present in all elections, whether there is an audit 
system or not.)  Many audit systems do require the involvement of the voter, and often 
the voter’s involvement is required to maintain the security of the system.  If a voter has 
some responsibility in the proper functioning of the audit system, those responsibilities 
must be simple enough for all voters to perform reliably and further voters must be 
motivated to actually perform them.  Audit systems must be useable for all voters; if 
necessary, accommodations must be made so that handicapped or otherwise impaired 
voters can reliably use the systems. 
 Poll workers want to interact with the audit systems as little as possible.  In the 
ideal case, a poll worker would never interact with the audit system.  Poll workers are 
already overburdened with many responsibilities.   Given that not interacting with the 
audit system, may not be a feasible goal, the next best situation is for poll workers to 
interact with the audit system exactly twice, once at the beginning of the day to start the 
system, and once at the end of the day to shut it down and prepare it to be transported to 
election headquarters.  Both setting up and shutting down the audit system should be as 
simple as possible.  Poll workers are paid employees; however, no assumptions can be 
made about their skill level.  There are no official requirements in order to be a poll 
worker and the training they receive is very minimal.  If possible, no technical 
background should be assumed.  In addition to setting up and shutting down the audit 
system, poll workers are the ones who will be on-site and will be the first to respond if 
any of the audit units malfunction or break down.  It is in the election’s best interests if 
the system is simple enough for the poll workers to fix minor problems immediately.  
Shutting down a voting station while waiting for a technician to arrive on site could cause 
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significant delays, especially during the peak voting times.  Finally, poll workers must be 
able to handle voter questions and concerns.  While simple voter questions about how to 
use the audit system correctly are to be expected and should not be taxing for any poll 
worker, of more serious concern is voters who claim that the audit trail is not accurately 
reflecting their selections.   
The objective of any audit system is to accurately reflect the selections that a 
voter makes on the DRE.  Any report to the contrary needs to be taken seriously.  Poll 
workers need procedures that will allow them to address voters concerns in a professional 
manner while not violating the privacy of the voter’s vote, something they are legally 
entitled to.  For the moment, it is safe to assume that any report of an inaccurate audit is 
either a mistake or the act of a malicious voter who intends to derail the election by 
forcing a machine out of service or invalidating the election results.  For the voters who 
are simply mistaken in their report, it should be sufficient for the poll worker to instruct 
the voter on the proper use of the system and how to make a change to their selections.  
For a voter who insists that the machine is changing their vote, if possible, the poll 
worker should confirm the voter’s claims, again without violating the voter’s privacy.  If 
the poll worker can not confirm the claim without violating the voter’s privacy then, there 
should be clear procedures in place for when and how to take a machine out of service, 
however, an election official should probably be involved that decision.  
 For election officials, one of their main concerns is money.  Election officials are 
concerned with the initial cost of the audit equipment, any continuing costs that result 
from using the system, and the cost to perform an audit.  The initial costs cover only the 
equipment that is needed.  The continuing costs of the audit system are the costs incurred 
by using the audit system during each election.  These continuing costs can include any 
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fresh supplies that must be purchased as well as the costs of transporting and storing the 
material produced by the audit.  Finally, election officials must be concerned with the 
costs of auditing the election using the system.  Although it is unlikely that an entire 
election would ever be audited if there were no indication of fraud or other problems, 
even auditing a small percentage of the votes could incur significant costs.  If the audit 
can be automated with special hardware or software, the costs of those systems will be 
important.  If the audit can not be automatically counted and must be done by hand, then 
elections officials must consider how long it takes to perform an audit and how many 
people will be needed to perform the job.   
 Given the different needs of voters, poll workers and election officials, it is 
challenging for audit systems to completely fulfill everyone’s needs.  Choices must be 
made and there are tradeoffs to every design.  The user study described below measures 
only how well the audit systems serve voters needs.   
 
VI. User Study Protocol 
To measure how well the VVAATT and VVPAT met voter’s needs, 36 potential 
voters were asked to participate in a user study.  They voted on two different voting 
systems, one with a VVAATT audit and one with a VVPAT audit.  The study was 
designed to focus on voters three main needs: 
1. usability – How easily can voters use the system?  Do they need instructions?  
What is the general experience of using the audit system? 
2. effectiveness – How well does the system serve as an audit?  Are voters able 
to spot mistakes in the audit? 
3. time – How long does it take for voters to use the system? 
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Usability was measured qualitatively through observation as well as through surveys 
completed after the voters finished using each system.  Effectiveness was measured by 
purposefully inserting mistakes into the audit trail.  Observations as well as survey 
questions helped determine how many errors voters had discovered.  Timing data was 
collected by measuring how long voters took on each of the elections they completed.  
The protocol for this study was approved by the MIT Committee on the Use of Humans 
as Experimental Subjects,    
 
VI – 1. Subjects – Potential Voters 
The thirty-six subjects who participated in the study were recruited from the MIT 
community.  They were all eligible voters, above the age of eighteen.  While the majority 
of subjects were US citizens, not all subjects were.  This decision was justified because 
being a US citizen does not confer any special knowledge or abilities regarding the 
usability of audit mechanisms.  (All participants were fluent in English and had no 
trouble reading the voting interface or the surveys.)     
The poll of subjects, was mostly young and highly technical.  Almost half the 
subjects, forty-seven percent, were between ages eighteen and twenty-two and exactly 
seventy-five percent were between eighteen and thirty.  Seventy-eight percent of 
participants reported having used a computer for more than twenty hours in the week 
preceding their participation in the experiment.  Only one subject in the study did not 
own a computer and over sixty-three percent of participants owned two or more 
computers.  Ninety-seven percent listed an education level of some college experience or 
higher.   
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The participants were mostly novice voters.  Six subjects, seventeen percent, 
reported never having voted before and twenty-one subjects, fifty-eight percent reported 
having voted between one and five times previously.  (Seventy-five percent had voted 
fewer than five times.)  As a group, all the popular voting systems were represented in 
previous voting experience.  The most popular voting equipment used by subjects was the 
optical scan ballot.  Almost a third of participants reported having voted on an optical 
scan ballot.  Only two subjects reported having voted on a DRE.  Eleven participants 
reported having voted through an absentee ballot. 
With such a young and highly technical subject pool one would expect that these 
participants might be better able to use the audit mechanisms then a more representative 
voting population would.  Participants in study would be better at following instructions 
and carefully checking their ballots.  In addition, some participants may have been 
familiar with the DRE security controversy and paper trail questions.  (When the Diebold 
voting code first appeared on the internet, the story was being discussed around MIT and 
a few students even posted parts of the code on their own websites until MIT asked them 
to take it down.) 
 
VI – 2. Equipment 
 Although there were originally thoughts of using a commercial voting machine in 
the experiment, the changes needed in the audit trails as well as the control needed over 
the election races made this impractical.  Instead, we implemented VVAATT and 
VVPAT on an experimental voting system.  
 The voting system used was the Low Error Voting Interface, LEVI.  LEVI is a 
voting interface that has been designed and tested through the CalTech MIT Voting 
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Technology Project.  One of the main advantages of using the LEVI system was the 
ability to control how the audit systems worked and the ability to easily create elections.  
Another significant advantage of the LEVI system, was that none of the subjects had 
previous experience with the interface so all subjects started off with the same 
background level.   
Previous experimentation had shown that the LEVI ballot enabled voters to be 
more accurate and less error prone as compared to a simulated commercial voting 
interface.  A previous user study comparing the LEVI ballot to a commercial ballot found 
that among the users who did make errors, about half as many errors were made on the 
LEVI ballot as compared to the commercial ballot.  Voters averaged 1.8 errors on LEVI 
and 3.1 errors on the commercial system. [15] 
LEVI provides additional forms of feedback that are not available on many 
commercial systems.  Some additional feedback includes side navigation tabs on the 
screen that allow the voter to easily see which races they have made selections in and 
which they haven’t.  Below, in figure 5, are two screen shots of the LEVI interface.  The 
image on the left shows the interface when the voter is making selections in the “3rd 
District Court of Appeals” race.  The green side tabs indicate races that the voter has 
already made selections in.  These green tabs also list the candidates that the voter 
selected, even when the race is not visible on the screen.  The grey tabs are races the 
voter has not yet made a selection in.  When a race allows the voter to choose more than 
one candidate, the tab turns green incrementally.  For a two selection race, once the voter 
has made one selection, the tab will be half green, once there is a second selection, the tab 
will become fully green.   
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Figure 5: Screen shots of LEVI voting interface. 
 
The image on the right in figure 5 shows the LEVI review screen.  The review 
screen gives a clearly delineated list of all races and uses color to help emphasize the 
races that a voter has either skipped or undervoted.  (An undervote is when a voter makes 
fewer selections than they are allowed, for example selecting only one candidate in a two 
selection race.)  Touching any of the races on the review screen will bring the voter back 
to that race and allow them to change their vote.  These additional forms of feedback are 
very effective in reducing accuracy mistakes and undervotes.  Many times during the 
experiment, we observed subjects going back to previous races to fix errors that they 
observed on the side tabs or through the review screen.   
 Though LEVI was a starting point for our experiment, we still needed to add 
some external hardware and a few software changes as well in order to obtain the entire 
voting system, audit included.  Both voting systems started off with a fifteen inch 
diagonal touch screen. 
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VI – 3. VVPAT Implementation 
To implement the VVPAT audit, we purchased a standard receipt printer and 
created a unit to house the printer and protect the paper trail that was produced.  The 
VVPAT printer was a Samsung model SRP-270 dot matrix printer.  Although each voting 
manufacturer makes their own unique VVPAT printer the one characteristic common to 
almost all of them is that the paper trail produced is protected in some manner so that the 
voter can not touch or disturb the paper.  A window is provided over the paper so the 
voter can see their choices once they are printed.  In order to create a more authentic 
election, a plastic housing unit for the receipt printer protected the paper trail and ensured 
that voters could not touch or modify the paper.  As you can see in the image below, the 
experimental housing unit is similar to the commercial one and achieves the same results.   
 
   
Figure 6: Experimental VVPAT voting unit is seen on the left and Sequoia’s AVC Edge@ 
with VeriVote Printer is seen on the right.  The printer in the Sequoia unit is behind the 
panel on the left.  [16]  
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 Small software modifications had to be made in order to accommodate the 
VVPAT audit.  In the standard LEVI interface, the review screen is the last step in the 
voting process; the “Submit Ballot” button simply submitted the ballot and ended the 
program.  However, when using the VVPAT system, instead of submitting the ballot 
from the review screen, the voter has to first print their ballot.  The “Submit Ballot” 
button on the review screen was changed to read “Print Record” and a new screen was 
added to the end of the voting process.  When using the VVPAT audit, once the record is 
printed, the voter has two options, they can accept the printed record and cast their ballot, 
or they can go back and make changes to their vote.  The final selection screen added to 
the LEVI interface was based on the screen shot found in the Clark County, Nevada, 
instructions for voters guide. [17]  The final selection screen as well as the Nevada 
reference are shown in the images below. 
 
 
Figure 7: Final selection screen in experimental VVPAT setup (on left) and Nevada 
instructions to voters (on right).   
 
VI – 4. VVAATT Implementation 
 VVAATT has not been widely implemented by many commercial voting vendors 
so the experimental system we built is based our own decisions about how to produce the 
most secure audit system while providing voters with the best experience possible.  For 
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the audio recording device, a tape recorder was used.  There were two reasons for this. 
First, tape recorders are easy to operate and are readily available.  Second, with a tape 
recorder, the voter is able to look at the recorder, see the wheels spinning and visually 
verify that the tape is recording.  Further, tape recorders do not contain a computer.  In 
order not to waste tape, the recorder used a voice activated recording mode.  This mode 
records to the tape only when audio is detected.  For the most part, this worked well, 
however, there was a problem with background noise.  Because the tape recorder did not 
always detect audio though the microphone input, which was connected to the computer, 
it tried to pick up input from its internal microphone which resulted in background noise.  
Using a tape recorder without an internal microphone would have reduced this problem. 
 In order to protect the tape from being tampered with by voters, a protected box 
was constructed that allowed the audio wires to be connected properly while still 
blocking off access to the tape recorder.  The top of the protective box is see-through 
plexiglass so that the voter can see that the tape recorder is recording while the audio is 
playing.  One inadvertent result of the protective box was that the volume control was 
inaccessible.  This problem was solved by providing headphones with volume control on 
the cord.  The image below shows the tape recorder in the protective box. 
 
 
Figure 8: VVAATT audio recorder in protective box. 
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 The only software changes needed for VVAATT was audio capability at the key 
interaction points.  To add this capability, we used a java api that supported Microsoft 
Wave files and then created individual files for all the candidates, races and actions such 
as “voted”, “unvoted”, and “changed a vote”.  The sound files were created using the 
AT&T Natural Voices Text to Speech engine.  We decided to use a speech generating 
tool in order to avoid problems of biased voicing and uneven tone.  Though a few 
different engines were considered, we felt the AT&T option was the best.  Most of the 
names were no trouble to produce and only a few required rewriting with additional 
sound cues.  Questions were included in the surveys to try to determine if using a 
computer generated voice was a good decision.   
 
VI - 5. Experiment Protocol 
 During the experiment, subjects voted on both the VVAATT and VVPAT 
systems.  Each subject completed four elections on each system.  One election was a 
normal election and contained no mistakes in the audit trail.  The other three elections 
each contained a single error in the audit trail. (See section VI - 7 for a description of the 
errors.)  Both the order of voting systems that subjects used and the order of the errors 
they received were randomized.  In between the different voting systems, subjects were 
given a short story to read that was unrelated to voting and served as a small distraction 
task.  After having voted on both systems, subjects were given four final surveys to 
complete.  The detailed experiment procedure follows. 
 
 30 
1. Subjects arrived at the MIT Media Lab.  Before starting the experiment, subjects 
signed consent forms and filled out a brief pre-survey.  (All surveys can be found 
in Appendix E.) 
2. Subjects were prepped for the experiment with a short experiment script.  The 
exact script can be found in Appendix A, however, the script gave the following 
information:  
•  The basic structure of how the experiment would procedure, voting 
four elections each on two different voting machines.  
• Informed the subject that both machines were touch screen and gave 
basic instructions on how to best use the machines. 
• Informed the subject that each voting booth contained instructions, 
they could look over if necessary. 
• Explained that their task was to accurately follow a voting agenda, a 
card with candidates listed for each race. 
• Informed the subject that the role of the person running the experiment 
was that of a poll worker and if they had any problems or questions as 
they preceded they could ask for help. 
• Answered any questions the subject may have had before voting. 
3. Subjects voted all four elections on the first voting system.   
4. Subjects completed a short distraction task, reading a short story unrelated to 
voting.  (This task lasted approximately one to two minutes.)  The intention of this 
task was to try to get participants minds off the voting task that they had just 
completed and back to a similar state of mind as when the first started.  The 
 31 
distraction task helped to reduce order differences that might otherwise be present 
in the data. 
5. Subjects voted all four elections on the second voting system. 
6. Subjects completed four surveys.  The first survey asked questions about the 
printed instructions in the voting booths, and the visual LEVI interface.  The 
second survey asked questions specific to the first voting system the subject voted 
on.  The third survey asked questions specific to the second system the subject 
voted on.  The fourth and final survey asked some comparison questions about the 
two systems. 
7. Subjects were asked if they had any final comments the surveys did not cover. 
8. Subjects were thanked for their time and compensated $10.   
 
VI - 6. Creating a Voting Experience 
 Throughout the experiment, a strong effort was made to simulate a realistic voting 
experience.  This was accomplished both through the language and terminology used as 
well as through the physical environment. 
 Throughout the experiment as many voting terms were used as possible.  
Computers were referred to as voting machines.  Subjects were directed to voting booths 
and experiment observers were the poll workers.   
 While there were some limitations to the changes we could make to the physical 
environment, as much as possible a realistic polling station was created.  The experiment 
was conducted in the basement atrium of the Media Lab.  This space is a large open 
public space that is easily accessible.  It was chosen for it’s similarity to many polling 
locations.    In addition to conducting the experiment in a location similar to a real polling 
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location, two voting booths were created to give the voter a sense of privacy.  Both voting 
booths included instructions on how to properly use the voting systems.  
 
 
Figure 9: Voting booths set up with a separating divider.   
 
VI - 7. Errors in the Audit Trail 
The purpose of inserting errors into the audit trail was to determine how well 
voters were able to use the audit trail to insure that their votes were accurately recorded, 
however, errors were not simply random.  The errors placed in the audit trail represented 
realistic changes that someone with malicious intentions might use to either affect the 
outcome of an election or cast significant doubt on the election results.  In the end, there 
were three error conditions:  
• Error Condition 1: changing a vote to a different candidate 
• Error Condition 2: removing a vote from a candidate 
• Error Condition 3: removing a race from the audit   
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Also briefly considered was an error condition where a candidate the voter did not select 
was given a vote in the audit trail, however, it was unclear how this kind of error would 
be translated in the audio audit and we needed to reasonably limit the size of our 
experiment.  Significant effort was invested to make sure that the error conditions 
translated symmetrically in both the audio and the paper trails.  It is important to note that 
for all error conditions, the errors only appeared in the audit trails, either the audio 
feedback or the printed record.  The visual interface that the subject was viewing always 
reflected the actual choices that had been made.   
 The first error condition was a simple change of candidates.  In this error 
condition, when the voter selected candidate A, candidate B would appear in the audit 
trail.  In the printed record this meant that candidate B was printed instead of candidate 
A.  In the audio, the voter heard, “voted for candidate B” instead of “voted for candidate 
A” even though they just pressed the selection button for candidate A.   
 
   
Figure 10: Error Condition 1, from left to right, screen shot from LEVI, paper record, 
audio transcript. 
Audio Transcript: 
 
“President” 
“Voted for John Hagelin 
and Nat Goldhaber” 
 
“United States Senator” 
“Voted for Michael 
Corliss” 
 
“State Representative” 
“Voted for Roy Grigsby” 
 
… 
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The second error condition was a missing candidate.  In this situation, a candidate 
that the voter cast a vote for did not appear in the audit record.  For example, if the voter 
cast a vote for candidate A in the President race then in the audit record, the President 
race would indicate that the voter had not cast any vote in that race.  In the audio audit we 
translated this situation into the candidate name not actually playing.  When the voter 
selected candidate A in the President race, they would hear “vote for” without any name 
being played.   
 
   
Figure 11: Error condition 2, LEVI interface, paper ballot, audio transcript.  
 
The final error condition was a race that was missing entirely.  In this error 
condition, a race that appeared on the screen and that the subject placed votes in did not 
appear in the audit trail.  For the paper records, the race was simply left off the record.  In 
the audio audit, no audio plays while the voter is voting the race.   The race title does not 
Audio Transcript:  
 
… 
“Register of Deeds” 
“Voted for Christine 
Keedy” 
 
“Electoral Board 
Members” 
“Voted for Ken Bade” 
“Voted for Chris Larkin” 
“Voted for “ 
 
“Sherif” 
… 
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play, and no audio is heard when the voter selects candidates.  The audio resumes as 
normal as soon as the voter moves out of the error race.    
 
      
Figure 12: Error Condition 3, LEVI Interface, paper record, audio transcript. 
 
VI - 8. Error Condition Variables 
 In addition to the three error conditions, there were two important variables that 
were considered in the experiment.  These included what kind of race the error occurred 
in, a single selection race or a multiple selection race, and how far down the ballot the 
error occurred, if the error was in the top, middle or bottom of the ballot. 
 The first variable, what kind of race the error occurred in was spread among the 
different error types, without really trying to obtain comparison data.  Error condition 
one, the changed name, was always placed in a single selection race.  The missing 
candidate, error condition two, was always in a multiple selection race.  The missing race 
error, error condition three, was placed in both single selection and multiple selection 
races.   
Audio Transcript: 
… 
“Member of the Board of 
Governors of Wayne 
State University” 
“Voted for Dorothy 
Gonzales” 
“Voted for Paul Nave” 
 
[Silence] 
 
“Member of the State 
Board of Education” 
“Voted for Lawrence 
Patrick” 
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 The error placement within the ballot variable was controlled within each error 
condition.  For each error condition there were three different elections.  One election 
contained the error in the top of the ballot, one contained the error in the middle of the 
ballot and one contained the error in the bottom of the ballot.   
 
VI - 9. Elections, Error Placements, and Voting Agendas 
Participants in the experiment each voted four elections on each voting system.  
While each of the four elections was unique, the composition of the elections was similar.    
Some of the races overlapped and some of the candidate names were used in more than 
one election.  The number of single selection and multiple selection races was fairly 
evenly distributed among the elections.  The table below shows the number of multiple 
selection races that each election contained.  All the elections had eleven races.  The full 
content of the elections can be found in Appendix B. 
 
 Single selection races Double selection races Triple selection races 
Election 1 7 4 0 
Election 2 8 3 0 
Election 3 8 2 1 
Election 4 7 3 1 
Table 1: Distribution of race types among the four elections. 
 
 When placing the error conditions, one election was assigned to each error 
condition and one election was used for the null condition.  Election 1 was used with the 
first error condition, Election 2 was used with the third error condition, Election 3 was 
the null error condition and Election 4 was the second error condition.  For each election 
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except Election 3 there were three conditions for the placement of the error.  Given that 
each election had eleven races, an error placed in the top of the ballot was in the first two 
races, races 1 and 2, an error in the middle of the ballot was in races 5, 6, or 7, and the 
error placed in the bottom of the ballot was in the last two races, races 10 and 11.  The 
table below shows the exact placement of all errors. 
 
 Error Condition 1 Error Condition 2 Error Condition 3 
Race 1   TOP 
Race 2 TOP  TOP  
Race 3    
Race 4    
Race 5  MIDDLE  
Race 6 MIDDLE  MIDDLE 
Race 7    
Race 8    
Race 9    
Race 10  BOTTOM  
Race 11 BOTTOM  BOTTOM 
Table 2: Distribution of errors in the ballots. 
 
 Each election had only a single voting agenda, the “cheat-sheet” given to voters 
that instructed them how to vote each election.  On each voting agenda, all the races in 
that particular election were listed and the subject was either specifically instructed on 
who to vote for, told to vote for anyone of their choosing, or told to skip the race.  While 
the majority of races specifically told the subject who to vote for, some races gave the 
subject a choice of who to select and some races instructed the voter to skip the race.  It 
was important to include some races where the voter did not place a vote so they could 
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see how a race that they had skipped would appear in the audit trail.  Appendix C 
contains all the voting agendas used during the study.   
 Although voters were asked to use the voting agendas while they were voting, 
voters were not able to use the voting agendas to check their printed record.  This 
decision was validated by the fact that even in a highly salient race such as the president, 
there was no difference in the number of errors found relative to the other races that 
weren’t as easy to remember.1   
 
VI – 10. Response to Voters who Reported Errors 
 When voters in the study reported errors to the poll worker, the response was  
uniform in addressing the voters concern while still encouraging them to continue voting.  
When voters reported errors to the poll worker, the poll worker would first try to briefly 
get the voter to explain the exact nature of the error.  Some voters offered this 
explanation without prompting while other voters were asked “What is the problem?”  or 
“For which candidate is this a problem?”  Getting the voter to explain the error was a way 
of double checking that they were reporting the error that was intended to be present and 
not some other problem.  After the voter explained the specific error, the poll worker told 
the voter that they would “take note of the problem” and voters were then encouraged to 
continue voting.  Although in a real election, continuing to vote given a problem in the 
audit trail would not be an appropriate response, in this election voters were asked to 
continue in order to collect uniform and complete voting data from all subjects.     
  
                                                 
1 An error of type 3, missing race, was placed in the President race. 
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VI – 11. Subject Voting Assignments 
 Given all the different variables present in the experiment care was taken to 
properly randomize subjects in the voting pool.  Half the subjects voted on the VVPAT 
system first and half the subjects voted on the VVAATT system first.  All subjects 
completed the same four elections on both systems.  The four elections consisted of one 
election of each of the error conditions and one null election.  In addition, for each 
subject, one election contained the error in the top of the ballot, one contained the error in 
the middle of the ballot, and one contained the error at the bottom of the ballot.  
 The order of the errors that subjects saw was also carefully randomized.  In an 
effort to simplify the error randomizing, we randomized only the order of the three actual 
errors and then considered the placement of the null condition afterwards.  This 
simplified randomization because we consolidated the placement of the null condition 
down to three placements instead of all four.  (The second and third election positions 
were equivalent as they both represented a “middle” placement of the null condition.)  A 
latin square design was used to obtain the three error condition orderings: 
• Error condition 1, Error condition 2, Error condition 3 
• Error condition 2, Error condition 3, Error condition 1 
• Error condition 3, Error condition 1, Error condition 2 
Twelve subjects voted each of the three orderings.  Within the twelve subjects for each 
ordering, four voted with the null error condition placed as the first race, four voted with 
the null error condition in the middle (two as race 2 and two as race 3) and four voted 
with the null error condition as the last race.  In addition, within each error condition, 
twelve subjects voted with the error in the top of the ballot, twelve subjects voted with 
the error in the middle and twelve subjects voted with the error at the end of the ballot.  
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Details of which subjects voted on which machine first and with what error order can be 
found in Appendix D. 
 
VII. Experiment Results 
  Given that this experiment was designed to measure to measure the usability, 
effectiveness and the time required to vote for each audit system, it would have been 
ideal all our results and observations fit neatly into one of these categories.  Instead, two 
additional result categories have been added.  From observation and some survey data, 
many interesting results regarding subjects’ attitudes towards both the paper trail and 
audio trail were found which did not quite fit in any of the three original categories.  The 
results presented below clearly show that both the VVAATT and VVPAT audit systems 
have strong values as well as weak ones.     
 
VII – 1. Usability 
 From a usability perspective, both systems faired very well.  The vast majority of 
subjects had no trouble using the voting system and audit trails.  There were only a few 
recurring usability problems observed in the VVAATT system and the VVPAT system.   
 While post survey data indicated that about sixty-four percent of participants did 
read the printed voting instructions that were present in the voting booth, it is unclear that 
all of these participants read the instructions before starting to vote.  From observations 
taken during the study, only noted three subjects (8.3 %) were noted as having looked at 
the instructions prior to starting to vote.  There is no way to be sure that we did not miss 
some people looking at the instructions or simply not write it down, however, it is 
unlikely that all of the people who indicated that they read the instructions, actually read 
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them before starting to vote.  Many subjects were observed looking at the instructions 
while their paper ballots were printing which could account for the high response rate.  
Especially with a participant group so heavily immersed in technology, it is not 
unsurprising that many people jumped into voting without having read the instructions.  
Systems that are depend on people reading instructions are doomed to failure.  
 In the VVPAT voting system, the one systematic usability problem observed was 
that many people got to the review screen, reviewed their votes and then didn’t know 
what to do.  A few people specifically made comments indicating that they were looking 
for a “submit ballot” button while some subjects simply weren’t certain that they had to 
print their ballot.  Verbal comments made when subjects encountered this problem 
included “How do I submit?” and “I don’t see submit ballot.”  This problem was 
observed with seven subjects, almost twenty percent.  For six of these subjects, VVPAT 
was the first system they voted on.  Their confusion can not be attributed to the fact that 
they had seen a “Submit ballot” button in the VVAATT system.   
 Results from post survey data support the observations that subjects had few 
problems using the VVPAT system.  Only one subject disagreed with the statement that 
“It was easy to create my printed record.”  All subject responses averaged out to 4.19 
(using 5 as strongly agree, 4 agree, 3 neutral, 2, disagree, 1 strongly disagree), fairly 
strongly in the agree side.  Subjects also indicated that it was easy to accept or reject their 
paper ballot although subjects were slightly more neutral on this statement with responses 
averaging out to 3.77.  When asked if it was easy to read their printed record, 25 subjects 
agreed that it was easy while 4 disagreed and 7 remained neutral.  Post survey results 
indicated that the font size was ok for most people.  The average of responses was 3.77 
and only 3 people disagreed that the font size was large enough.  Participants were mostly 
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evenly split when asked if they thought it would be easier to read the paper ballot if they 
could have held it themselves.  Eleven people disagreed that it would have been easier, 
10 people were neutral and 15 people thought it would have been easier to hold the ballot 
themselves.  (This is however, a hard question for people to judge, because they are 
making a guess about what a behavior would be like, not evaluating something they had 
just done.)  Overall, most subjects enjoyed voting on the VVPAT system and found it 
easy to vote on this system.  Only one person disagreed with the statement “I enjoyed 
voting on this system” and the average was solidly in the agree range at 3.91.  Almost all 
subjects agreed that it was easy to vote on the VVPAT system.  Only one subject was 
neutral on this statement and the average was 4.17.   
 Subjects had a similarly positive experience with VVAATT system.  There were 
very few systematic usability problems observed and post survey results indicated a 
positive experience for most voters.  One systematic problem observed on the VVAATT 
system that was not seen as much with the VVPAT system was problems with the touch 
screen.  Although it was thought that the screens were basically the same in the two 
systems, there were clearly some differences and the screen used with the VVAATT was 
not as sensitive as the screen used with the VVPAT system.  Many people had to make 
several attempts to get their touch to register.  Unfortunately, people’s normal reaction to 
touch the screen for a longer period of time worked against them as shorter and harder 
taps seemed to work best on the screen, not longer taps.  While this problem was not 
related to the VVAATT system and could have easily been corrected with another touch 
screen, one usability problem that was related to the VVAATT implementation was that 
subjects occasionally failed to notice that their selection had actually registered.  The 
underlying problem here was that in the VVAATT implementation, the audio feedback 
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played before the visual interface updated and the visual interface was not updated until 
after the audio finished playing.  A few times, we noticed that subjects would make a 
candidate selection, look for the visual interface to update and see that it hadn’t so they 
would press their selection again, however, this had the effect of removing their vote, 
because the first press had also registered.  This caused voters to become lost and 
confused as to what was happening in the interface.  Most voters who encountered this 
problem, quickly realized what was going on and were able to adjust by moving slower in 
the interface.  Only in two cases did we intervene for a voter who was continuing to get 
lost.  After advising these voters to move slower in the interface and wait until the visual 
had updated they had no trouble using the interface.  Better integration of the audio 
feedback into the visual interface could have avoided these problems. 
  Responses to the survey questions for the VVAATT system were generally 
positive and indicated that subjects did not encounter many usability problems.  Most 
subjects indicated that it was easy to understand the audio feedback.  Six subjects 
disagreed that it was easy and only one was neutral on this topic.  The average of the 
responses was 3.83, fairly strongly in the agree side.  Participants were slightly critical of 
the voice in the audio feedback.  Responses to the statement “the audio feedback was 
pleasant to listen to” averaged to only 3.16 and responses to the statement “the audio 
feedback was too robotic for my tastes” averaged to 3.22.  While this is not a strong 
indication it does still show that there are some tradeoffs to using computer generated 
speech.  Participants mildly agreed that the audio verification helped them confirm their 
selections, average response 3.78.  Subjects agreed that when they heard mistakes in the 
audio they noticed the mistake immediately, average response 4.0.  Overall subjects 
agreed that they enjoyed voting on the VVAATT system and that it was easy to vote on 
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this system, though their responses were not quite as strong as in the VVPAT system.  
The responses averaged to 3.42 for the question of if they enjoyed voting on the audio 
system and 3.72 for the statement that it was easy to vote on the audio system.   
   
VII – 2. Effectiveness 
 When measuring effectiveness of the voting systems we looked at how subjects 
reacted to the mistakes in the audit trail.  Subjects’ reactions were broken down into two 
important measures.  The most important measure was how many errors subjects reported 
to the “poll worker” or experiment observer.  However, there were also cases when 
participants were observed finding an error that they did not report to the poll worker.  
Although in a real election it would do no good for a subject to find an error and not 
report it to a poll worker, these were noteworthy situations in this study since with more 
voter education discovered errors could become reported errors.  An error that is never 
found can never be reported.   
 The results strongly indicate that subjects have an easier time identifying and 
reporting errors in the VVAATT system then in the VVPAT system.  Almost ten times as 
many errors were discovered in the VVAATT system then in the VVPAT.  Using the 
VVAATT system, twenty-two subjects discovered twenty-six errors and reported fifteen 
of them.  Using the VVPAT system, two subjects discovered three errors, none of which 
were reported to the poll worker.  The fifteen errors reported in the VVAATT system 
were reported by twelve voters.  The graph below represents this data.   
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Figure 13: Errors noticed and reported in each voting system. 
 
The numbers in the above graph are based solely on observations.  The number of 
reported errors was easy to measure.  A reported error was defined as an error that the 
subject encountered and reported to the poll worker.  The subject had to tell the poll 
worker about the error prior to submitting the ballot.  (Telling the poll worker there was a 
problem after having submitted a ballot will not help protect the security of the voter’s 
vote.)  In some cases, a change in behavior clearly indicated that a subject had noticed an 
error even if they did not report it.  While sometimes the behavior change was subtle, a 
shake of the head, an especially long pause or simply a strange look in their face, in most 
cases, the behavior change was more obvious.  Some voters started selecting and 
unselecting the same candidate, or moving back and forth between races.  While the 
number of reported errors is an accurate representation of what happened in the 
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experiment, the number of noticed errors, at least for the VVAATT system, under-
represents the true number of noticed errors.   
While many people strongly reacted to the errors in the audit trail, other people’s 
reaction was much more subtle and could not be visually verified.  To try to get a 
measure of how many people this affected, post survey questions asked subjects if they 
had noticed any mistakes in the audit trail.  The question asked subjects to either agree, 
disagree or indicate that they were not sure in response to the statement “There were 
some mistakes in the {printed record/audio verification}.”  (Asked as two separate 
questions.)  Results from this question indicated significant differences in the two audit 
mechanisms.  While twenty-nine subjects agreed with this statement for the VVAATT 
system, only three subjects agreed with the statement for the VVPAT system.  For the 
VVAATT system, this indicates that at least seven subjects noticed an error that was not 
visually identified.  This would indicate at least seven additional errors that were noticed, 
however, it is quite likely that the additional noticed errors is more than seven because 
some subjects may have noticed more than one error.  While one additional person 
indicated that there were errors in the paper trail than was counted in the observations, it 
is not clear how to interpret this data point.  The two other subjects who were observed 
finding an error in the paper trail pressed the “Make Changes” button on the final review 
screen indicating that they had noticed the error.  Pressing the make changes button was 
not counted as reporting the error because nothing was said to the poll worker.  (See 
section VII - 4 for more discussion on this topic.) 
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Figure 14: Responses to post survey question asking subjects if they noticed mistakes in 
the audit trails.   
 
 One additional interesting view of the error data is how many errors of each type 
were caught.  In the VVAATT system, subjects were much more likely to find errors of 
type 1, a changed name, than they were to find the other two errors with missing 
information.  However, in the VVPAT system, subjects were more likely to find errors of 
type 2 and 3, missing information.  Using the VVAATT system, subjects found eighteen 
errors from error condition 1, the changed name, however, subjects only found three 
errors of the missing name condition and only five errors of the missing race condition.  
These differences in values are statistically significant.  A single factor ANOVA test on 
these three values yields a p value of 1.9 x 10-5.  Of the three errors found in the VVPAT 
system, one was of a missing name and two were of missing races.  While this data is not 
statistically significant, ANOVA p value of 0.36, it does reveal an interesting trend.  It 
 48 
seems likely that the only reason the VVPAT data is not statistically significant is 
because there are not enough data points.  
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Figure 15: Noticed and reported errors broken down by type.  The left graph is VVAATT 
errors, the right is VVPAT errors.    
 
VII – 3. Time Spent Voting 
 Subjects spent slightly longer voting on the VVAATT system then they did voting 
on the VVPAT system.  Subjects averaged 136 seconds per election on the VVAATT 
system and 122 seconds per election on the VVAATT system.  This is about ten percent 
slower.  A paired sample t-test indicated that the difference in means was statistically 
significant (p = 0.0104).  Although the average amount of time spent voting on the two 
systems is similar, the standard deviation of times on the VVAATT system is larger than 
the standard deviation on the VVPAT system.  The standard deviation of values in the 
VVAATT system was 55.67 seconds while the standard deviation of values in the 
VVPAT system was only 38.08 seconds.  The graph below shows a box and whisker 
representation of the time data.  The median values in each group are almost exactly the 
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same, 120 seconds; however, the quartiles in the VVAATT data have a much larger 
range.  One of the outliers in the print data falls well within the VVAATT fourth quartile.   
 
 
Figure 15: Box and whisker graph of times spent voting. 
 
 While the time data collected is important and valuable, we do not want to 
overuse this information.  Broad and far reaching conclusions based on this data are 
inappropriate because the time data that collected is extremely implementation 
dependent.  A different implementation of the voting system would have resulted in 
significantly different times.  Previous user studies have shown that the LEVI interface is 
slightly slower than some of the commercial voting interfaces. [15] A different visual 
interface would have yielded different times.  In the VVAATT system, faster times 
would have resulted with different audio files, faster speaking voice, fewer words, etc.  In 
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the VVPAT system, a faster printer would have resulted in faster times.  One last 
complication when trying to make conclusions from the time data is that the data includes 
the races where voters discovered mistakes in the audit trail.  While in some cases, the 
voter was only distracted for a short amount of time, less than five seconds, in other cases 
voting was interrupted for longer periods of time, thirty to sixty seconds.  
 One strong time related found in the data was that many subjects perceived the 
audio system as slower.  This sentiment was much stronger than the actual data indicated.  
When directly comparing the time spent voting on each election, in forty-five percent of 
the elections, subjects actually took more time to vote on the print system then the audio 
system.  However, even with this mostly balanced data, the majority of subjects felt that 
voting on the VVAATT system was slower than voting on the VVPAT system.  In a post 
survey question, subjects were asked if they felt the audio slowed them down.  Only two 
people disagreed with the statement that the audio slowed them down and only two 
people remained neutral.  The average response for this question was strongly in the 
agree field at 4.28.  Twelve subjects wrote additional comments down indicating that 
they felt that the audio process was too slow.  In most cases the sentiment was that the 
slowness was frustrating, however, in three cases subjects indicated that the slowness was 
potentially helpful.  One subject wrote that “the audio system was very slow.   The lag 
caused a little frustration.”  Of the three subjects who commented that the slower voting 
pace could be an advantage, only one gave a reason that “it forces voter to verify 
selections.”     
 There are two factors that could have led subjects to feel so strongly that the audio 
system was slower; one is that the visual interface in the audio system felt less responsive 
to voters, the other is that the time spent voting on the audio system was more active then 
 51 
the time on the print system.  Because the visual interface in the VVAATT system did 
not update until the audio finished playing, the interface felt much less responsive to 
participants and could have left participants with the sense of slowness.  In addition, the 
time spent voting on the audio system fully represents time that the subject was actively 
voting while the time in the paper system includes time that the subject was waiting for 
the paper to finish printing.  In the VVPAT system, subjects spent as much as 30 seconds 
waiting for their paper record to print.  It was easy for voters to mentally “check out” 
when they printed their paper record and not realize they were still voting.         
 
VII – 4. Attitudes and Responses to the Paper Trail 
 Observations from the study indicated that many subjects did not carefully review 
the paper record of their votes prior to casting their ballot.  The lack of errors found in the 
paper trail is a direct result of this observation.  The majority of the subjects did not spend 
more than a few seconds reviewing their paper record.  Some voters reviewed the ballot 
as it was printing, however, many subjects completely ignored the ballot while it was 
printing.  Several subjects used the time while the ballot was printing to look at the voting 
instructions which were inside the voting booth.   
 Several subjects made a selection to cast their ballot before the record finished 
printing.  This meant that the ballot was still printing when the voter made a selection in 
the race. Fourteen subjects, thirty-nine percent of participants, cast at least one ballot in 
this manner.  Five subjects submitted all four of their ballots before printing had 
completed and one additional subject submitted the first record before it had finished 
printing.  (The interface had a short delay that prevented subjects from immediately 
making a selection after they started printing their ballot, it did not fully prevent the voter 
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from making a selection while printing was still in progress.)  While commercial voting 
systems may not allow voters to cast a ballot before it is fully printed, this behavior is 
illustrative of voters’ attitudes towards the paper trail.  Many voters do not believe that it 
is necessary to check the paper record and will not invest the time to check it.  Six 
participants wrote comments on their post surveys that very clearly illustrated this 
attitude: 
• “Absolutely no need for paper receipt.  Electronic vote was fine.  Paper receipt is 
a waste of time and paper.”  
• “I checked the review on the screen and didn’t check what was printed.  I never 
saw a printer that printed a different candidate name than it was sent.”  
• “I’m not sure if it’s necessary to have the voter review the paper record.” 
One other behavior observed was that for all of the VVPAT errors that were 
found, the subjects first reaction was to press the “Make Changes” button on the DRE.  
Without being able to see that the selection on the screen did not match the selection on 
the printout, the voters assumed that the mistake was theirs’ and not the fault of the 
machine.  Because the experiment VVPAT implementation did not allow voters to make 
changes to their ballot after printing a record, we were unable to observe how voters 
would react if they continued to observe the same error.   
One final attitude that we tried to gauge was how subjects felt about the relative 
confidence of the paper record compared to the electronic record.  Before asking subjects 
this question, they were informed that the purpose of VVPAT was to “to have a paper 
record of each vote made during an election to serve as an audit form.”  Subjects were 
further informed that in a real election a small percentage of paper records would be 
checked and compared with the electronic records.  With this information, subjects were 
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asked to respond to the statement “In a real election, I would place greater trust in the 
paper records than the electronic records.”  Responses to this question overwhelmingly 
favored the paper records.  Only five subjects disagreed with the statement, eleven 
remained neutral and twenty agreed with the statement.  (Of these twenty, seven 
indicated that they strongly agreed with the statement.)  Subjects were also asked if they 
would feel confident in the results of an election if their county used a voting system with 
a paper record.  Almost all responses to this question were positive.  Only six subjects 
remained neutral while twenty-four agreed and six strongly agreed. 
 
VII – 5. Attitudes and Responses to the Audio Trail    
 While it was harder for subjects to ignore the audio feedback, then it was for them 
to ignore the paper trail, there were still interesting results observed of users’ attitudes 
towards the audio feedback.  Having observed so many people clearly notice an error in 
the audio trail and yet fail to report it to the poll worker, we wanted to try to figure out 
why.  After the subjects had completed their surveys, we asked subject why they had not 
reported the error to the poll worker.  In a majority of cases, subjects indicated that while 
they had noticed and been confused by the errors, they had assumed that it was a minor 
bug in the interface and not a noteworthy event.  In a real election, it is possible that 
voters would not wave off obvious mistakes; however, this kind of attitude is just as 
dangerous as voter’s lackadaisical attitude towards the paper trail.   
 Subjects generally did not pay much attention to the VVAATT tape recorder.  
While many subjects did notice it and a few were curious enough to read the short 
descriptive poster that was included in the voting booth, post survey results indicate that 
the majority of subjects did not pay attention to it while they were voting.  In the post 
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survey, subjects were asked to agree, disagree or indicate that they were not sure in 
response to the statement that “everything they heard in the headphones was recorded on 
the tape.”  Only nine subjects agreed that everything was recorded.  The majority of the 
subjects, twenty-five subjects, were not sure if everything they heard was recorded and 
two subjects disagreed.  Subjects actually would not have been able to hear any audio if 
the tape had not been recording, however, this was a hard concept for people to 
understand.  When asked if they would feel comfortable with the audio recording during 
a real election subjects were evenly split.  Fourteen subjects said they would not be 
comfortable with the recording, fifteen said they would feel comfortable and seven 
remained neutral.   
 Finally, through post survey questions, subjects were asked about their attitudes 
toward the relative trust they would place in the audio record as compared to electronic 
records.  The same as with the question that subjects answered regarding the paper trail, 
subjects were informed that the purpose of VVAATT was to “create an audio record of 
each vote that would serve as an audit.”  Subjects were also told that in a real election a 
small percentage of the audio records would be audited and compared with the electronic 
records.  When asked to respond to the statement “In a real election, I would place greater 
trust in the audio records than the electronic records” the majority of responses tended 
towards disagreement.  Eight subjects agreed with the statement, eight remained neutral, 
eighteen disagreed, and two strongly disagreed.  When asked if they would feel confident 
in the results of a county election that used a VVAATT system, subjects were exactly 
evenly split.  Eleven subjects indicated that they would not feel confident in the results; 
eleven subjects indicated that they would feel confident in the results and fourteen 
remained neutral.   
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Figure 16: Responses indicating how subjects would feel about the results of an election 
given three different auditing mechanisms. 
 
VII – 6. Experiment Subject Audit Preferences  
After completing surveys asking about their experience with each individual audit 
system, subjects completed one final survey which asked them to compare their 
experiences on the VVAATT and VVPAT systems.  When asked which system they 
preferred voting on and which system they found easier to vote on, participants had a 
slight preference for the VVPAT system, however, when asked which system they would 
feel most comfortable with for their own county elections, participants overwhelmingly 
selected VVPAT system.   
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 VVPAT VVAATT No Preference 
“I preferred voting on the 
__________ system” 
 
21 subjects 12 subjects 3 subjects 
“I found it easier to vote on 
the _________ system.” 
 
15 subjects 13 subjects 8 subjects 
“I would feel most confident 
in the results of an election 
when my county used a 
voting system with a 
_______________ audit 
system.” 
 
31 subjects 3 subjects 2 subjects 
 
(one subject 
indicated no 
preference between 
the two audit 
systems and one 
subject indicated no 
preference if there 
was an audit or not.) 
Table 3: Results from comparison survey questions. 
 
VII – 7. Results Overview 
 The strongest results that came out of this study were: 
• Both VVAATT and VVPAT were easy for subjects to use.  Very few systematic 
usability problems were seen in either system. 
• Participants found many more errors in the VVAATT audit trail then they did in 
the VVPAT paper records.  Seventy seven percent of subjects agreed that there 
were errors in the VVAATT audit trail compared to only eight percent who 
agreed that there were errors in the VVPAT paper records. 
• Voting on VVAATT took slightly longer then voting on VVPAT and many 
participants perceived a strong time difference. 
• Participants strongly preferred VVPAT to VVAATT when asked which audit 
system they would recommend to their county. 
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VIII – Hypothesis Explanations of Experiment Results 
 While some of the study results were fairly balanced and not out of the ordinary, 
there were a few results which were particularly unbalanced and surprising.  These results 
included the differences in the number of errors found in each voting system, the 
differences in the types of errors found with each system and the differences in voters’ 
attitudes towards each system.  For these results, some hypothesis explanations are 
provided below.  
 
VIII – 1. Differences in Number of Errors Found 
Subjects in this study found many more errors in the VVAATT audit then in the 
VVPAT audit.  There are a few potential explanations for this significant difference: 
• VVAATT provides immediate feedback to the voter.  The voter does not have to 
rely on their memory in order to check the audit. 
• VVAATT provides auditory feedback which does not take away the voters’ 
attention.  The multimodal feedback allows the voter to focus on both the audio 
and the visual at the same time. 
• VVAATT is integrated into the voting process.  It is not a separate step. 
• Checking the paper record in the VVPAT system is seen as an extra step.  Voters 
may view this step as optional or unnecessary. 
The fact that the VVAATT audit is contemporaneous with the changes the voter is 
making in the visual interface makes it much easier for voters to verify the audit.  There 
is no delay between the time that the voter makes a selection and the time that they verify 
the audit.  In the VVPAT system, there is a significant delay between the time that a voter 
selects a candidate and the time that they verify the selection in the paper trail.  This time 
 58 
delay may cause voters to forget who they voted for in a particular race.2  Another 
explanation for the higher number of errors caught in the VVAATT system is that the 
feedback is in audio form.  Providing feedback in a form that is different from the visual 
feedback the DRE is providing allows the voter to focus on both the DRE and the audit at 
the same time.  One final explanation is that VVAATT is fully integrated in the voting 
process, while VVPAT is an extra step in the voting process.  When voters are listening 
to the audio feedback they are directly involved in the voting process, however, when 
voters review their paper record, they have already reviewed their selections on the DRE 
screen.  Voters may have the sense that after they have reviewed their selections on the 
DRE, the voting process is finished.  This would cause them to ignore or only glance over 
the paper record.   
 
VIII – 2. Differences in Types of Errors Found 
Voters in our study identified mostly incorrect names when using the VVAATT 
system, however, they identified only missing names and races in the VVPAT system.  
One possible reason why subjects were able to identify so many more errors of a changed 
name, in the VVAATT system, is that when they hear the changed name, it is in direct 
conflict with what they are expecting to hear.  When audio is simply missing, the voter 
may not realize that it was missing because there is not as much conflict with their 
thought process.  In the case of a missing name, the audio that the voter expects to hear 
begins to play and only a short part is missing.  This missing audio segment may be too 
short a gap for the voter to realize that there was a problem before moving on to the next 
                                                 
2 Work is currently being done by some voting manufacturers to create contemporaneous VVPAT systems 
though they are not widely implemented yet. 
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race or candidate.  In the case of a missing race, the audio for the entire race is missing.  
The audio that the voter is expecting does not play at all; this longer piece of missing 
audio alerts voters to the problem.    
 With the VVPAT system, it may be easier for voters to identify missing 
information because as voters are scanning through the paper record, they may skim over 
the specific names, however, they will still be looking for information to appear.  Missing 
information stands out more than incorrect information because when one skims over 
incorrect information it can be misinterpreted as the correct information.  However, if 
nothing is there to take the place of the missing data then its absence is easier to notice. 
 
VIII – 3. Differences in Attitudes towards Each System 
Subjects general attitudes towards VVAATT and VVPAT vastly favored VVPAT 
over VVAATT.  Subjects indicated a mild preference for the VVPAT in choosing the 
system they felt was easier to vote on.  There was a stronger preference for VVPAT when 
asked which system voters preferred voting on.  However, VVPAT won by a landslide 
when voters were asked which system would make them feel most confident in election 
results.   
The first two results of voters’ preferred system and perceived easier system are 
not surprising.  Many subjects may have preferred voting on the VVPAT system, because 
they felt the process was faster and more efficient.  With so many participants having 
indicated that the slowness of the audio was frustrating to them, it is expected that these 
subjects as well as others would have preferred the paper version which did not have 
these problems.  With a better VVAATT implementation, the results from this question 
might have been more balanced between the two systems.  Given that participants were 
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pretty evenly split on the question of which voting system was easier, a better VVAATT 
system might begin to skew the results of this question towards the VVAATT system.   
 The trend in the final attitude question asking which system voters would make 
voters feel most confident in the election results is a landslide for the VVPAT system.  It 
is unlikely that a better VVAATT implementation would significantly change the results.  
There is no way to know for certain why the results are so skewed in this case, however, 
there are a few ideas that may be part of the explanation.   
• Lack of familiarity with audio records. 
• Incorrect perception of audio trails as flawed based on experience in the study. 
• Preference towards system which less intrusive. 
• Bias towards well known, non prototype system. 
First, there are no common precedents for keeping important records in an audio format.  
The only audio records that people are familiar with are voice mail archives and music 
and radio archives, however, all these records fit seamlessly into an audio form.  It would 
actually seem strange to try to keep music archives in a paper format.  Lack of familiarity 
with the archive format may have discouraged participants from relying on this medium.  
Another possible explanation is that when voters responded to this question, they were 
not aware that the errors they heard in the audio trail were intentional and part of our 
study.  Participants might have assumed that the audio trail always would contain errors 
and bugs and thus be unable to serve as a good audit.  Voters may also have chosen the 
audit trail which “inconvenienced them less.”  Many voters were able to simply ignore 
the paper trail by not actually confirming their votes, however, all voters had to interact 
with the audio trail which was an inconvenience.  Finally, especially voters in this user 
population may have had prior knowledge of the paper trail system.  Paper trails have 
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received a lot of publicity and may be more familiar to voters.  Audio audits, however, 
have not received much publicity and are in more of a prototype stage then the paper 
trails.  This lack of publicity and prototype status may also have discouraged people from 
choosing the VVAATT.   
 
VIIII. Conclusions 
 The user study presented here is a starting point for a significant investigation into 
auditing mechanisms.  It is not the end of the discussion.  Many more questions remain to 
be asked and many redesigns of the auditing equipment remain to be done.  It would be 
premature to take the results of this study and say definitively that VVAATT is the audit 
mechanism we should use with our DRE voting machines.  It is similarly premature to 
conclude that VVPAT should never be used.  It would be safe to conclude that the current 
implementation of VVPAT does not sufficiently allow voters to find errors in the audit.   
 One strong message that was revealed in this study is that audit mechanisms need 
to be carefully designed and tested.  Designers and manufactures of audit systems need to 
consider everyone involved in the voting process, the voter, the poll workers and election 
officials.  Each of these populations has different needs which can occasionally conflict.  
Choices need to be made to accommodate each stake holder.  For any audit system that is 
going to affect the voter, serious consideration and study of the usability of the system 
should be done.  The usability of the audit mechanisms is equally important as the 
usability of the DRE.  It is highly unlikely that an audit mechanism that is not tested will 
be successful.   
 Another message to be taken from this work is that audit mechanisms are still 
premature right now.  Very few voting manufacturers were thinking about auditing 
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before 2003 when many security concerns began arising.  The systems that we have right 
now, VVPAT and VVAATT, have not gone through enough design iterations to be 
considered a “final product.”  With a few more design iterations, many of the usability 
problems that were observed could be significantly reduced.  In addition, audit 
technologies as a group are relatively young.  There are many companies working to 
develop new kinds of audits.  Some of these companies are working on cryptographic 
protocols, some are working on audits that record what appears on the DRE screens and 
other techniques as well.  With so many new audit technologies being developed and so 
many of these technologies only in their early versions of design, creating legislation that 
mandates any specific kind of technology will be counterproductive.  Our legal process 
tends to be slow-moving and difficult to change.  If a state enacts legislation requiring 
that DREs be equipped with paper trails now but down the line we discover that some 
other kind of audit technology is better or more accessible, will the state be able to react 
in time?  Even worse, if many states begin enacting legislation requiring a specific audit 
technology, will development of better technologies be stifled?  In such a developing 
space, making specific decisions about which technologies to use could inappropriately 
guide development of newer systems.  Now is a time to experiment and innovate, not 
legislate.   
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Appendix: Experiment Materials 
In the appendices that follow are all the materials that were used to conduct the user study 
presented in this thesis. 
   
Appendix A: Experiment Script - Used to prep subjects before 
they began voting 
Let me explain what we’re going to be doing here today. 
 
We’re going to ask you to complete eight different elections (or sequences of votes). 
Because this is a simulated voting situation, we’re going to tell you who to vote for. This 
[ show subject palm card ] is a palm card. It lists each race and gives instructions for who 
you will select in each race.  
 
You should think of your goal as trying your best to accurately vote for the people listed 
in your voting agenda.  
 
The experiment is going to proceed in the following way. After I finish explaining the 
instructions to you I am going to give you your palm card voting agenda and direct you to 
our voting machine. The machine is a touch screen interface. That means that for you to 
interact with it you should tap the screen firmly with the flat part of your finger [ 
demonstrate this to the subject ].  
 
During the experiment you will vote on 2 different voting systems.  In each voting booth 
there are instructions specific to each system.  Feel free to view this material before you 
begin voting.  For the purpose of these elections, I am the poll worker.  If you encounter 
any problems or have any questions as you go along, please feel free to inform me so I 
may assist you. 
 
Do you have any questions at this time? [ pause to answer questions subjects may have ] 
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Appendix B: Experiment Elections 
Election 1 – Error Condition 1 – Top of Ballot Error 
 
PRESIDENT - 1 
George BUSH/Dick CHENEY - Republican 
Al GORE/ Joe LIEBERMAN - Democratic 
John HAGELIN/Nat GOLDHABER - Natural Law 
Howard PHILLIPS/J. Curtis FRAZIER - U.S. Taxpayers Party 
Ralph NADER/Winona LaDuke - Green Party 
 
UNITED STATES SENATOR - 1 - Michael R. Corliss 
Spence ABRAHAM - Republican 
Debbie STABENOW - Democratic 
Mark A. FORTON - Reform 
Michael R. CORLISS - Libertarian 
William QUARTON - Natural Law 
John MANGOPOULOS - U.S. Taxpayers Party 
Matthew R. ABEL - Green Party 
 
STATE REPRESENTATIVE - 1 
Steve VEAR - Republican 
Roy GRIGSBY - Democratic 
 
MEMBER OF THE STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION - 2 
Terri Lynn LAND - Republican 
Lawrence C. PATRICK - Republican 
John AUSTIN - Democratic 
Kathleen STRAUS - Democratic 
Helen E.R. DITZHAZY - Reform 
Mary Ann LESSNER - Reform 
Diane BARNES - Libertarian 
Lynnea ELLISON - Natural Law 
Gail QUARTON - Natural Law 
Clara C. PILCHAK - U.S. Taxpayers Party 
Max RIEKSE - U.S. Taxpayers Party 
 
MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN - 
2 
Wendy ANDERSON - Republican 
Susy AVERY - Republican 
Larry DEITCH - Democratic 
Rebecca McGOWAN - Democratic 
Nick WAUN - Reform 
Tim MAULL - Libertarian 
Marvin SUROWITZ - Libertarian 
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Lisa Anne PUCCIO - Natural Law 
David James KNIGHT - U.S. Taxpayers Party 
Joe SANGER - U.S. Taxpayers Party 
Scott S. TRUDEAU - Green Party 
 
MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERISTY - 
2 
Connie BINSFELD - Republican 
George Scott ROMNEY - Republican 
Dorothy V. GONZALES - Democratic 
Cal RAPSON - Democratic 
Michael H. MILLER - Libertarian 
Violet STEELE - Libertarian 
Robert GALE - U.S. Taxpayers Party 
 
MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF WAYNE STATE UNIVERSITY - 
2 
Michael KELLY - Republican 
Mary Kay SHIELDS - Republican 
Paul MASSARON - Democratic 
Jackie WASHINGTON - Democratic 
Scotty BOMAN - Libertarian 
Thomas W. JONES - Libertarian 
Frederick KLINE - U.S. Taxpayers Party 
Lucretia C. STURDIVANT - U.S. Taxpayers Party 
James J. NICITA - Green Party 
 
COUNTY CLERK - 1 
Badi BADIOZAMANI - Independent  
Judy ELLIOTT - Republican 
Diana FOSS - Democratic 
Mike SCHMIER - Democratic 
 
COUNTY TREASURER - 1 
Sandra S. THATCHER - Republican 
 
DRAIN COMMISSIONER - 1 
Todd CARSON - Republican 
Rich GOSSE - Republican 
Kenneth W. STRONG - Republican 
 
COUNTY SURVEYOR - 1 
John W. BEARD - Republican 
Joe GUZZARDI - Democratic 
Edward R. REED - Republican 
Lingel H. WINTERS – Democratic 
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************************************************ 
Election 1 – Error Condition 1 – Error in Middle of Ballot 
 
PRESIDENT - 1 
George BUSH/Dick CHENEY - Republican 
Al GORE/ Joe LIEBERMAN - Democratic 
John HAGELIN/Nat GOLDHABER - Natural Law 
Howard PHILLIPS/J. Curtis FRAZIER - U.S. Taxpayers Party 
Ralph NADER/Winona LaDuke - Green Party 
 
UNITED STATES SENATOR - 1 
Spence ABRAHAM - Republican 
Debbie STABENOW - Democratic 
Mark A. FORTON - Reform 
Michael R. CORLISS - Libertarian 
William QUARTON - Natural Law 
John MANGOPOULOS - U.S. Taxpayers Party 
Matthew R. ABEL - Green Party 
 
STATE REPRESENTATIVE - 1 
Steve VEAR - Republican 
Roy GRIGSBY - Democratic 
 
MEMBER OF THE STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION - 2 
Terri Lynn LAND - Republican 
Lawrence C. PATRICK - Republican 
John AUSTIN - Democratic 
Kathleen STRAUS - Democratic 
Helen E.R. DITZHAZY - Reform 
Mary Ann LESSNER - Reform 
Diane BARNES - Libertarian 
Lynnea ELLISON - Natural Law 
Gail QUARTON - Natural Law 
Clara C. PILCHAK - U.S. Taxpayers Party 
Max RIEKSE - U.S. Taxpayers Party 
 
MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN - 
2 
Wendy ANDERSON - Republican 
Susy AVERY - Republican 
Larry DEITCH - Democratic 
Rebecca McGOWAN - Democratic 
Nick WAUN - Reform 
Tim MAULL - Libertarian 
Marvin SUROWITZ - Libertarian 
Lisa Anne PUCCIO - Natural Law 
David James KNIGHT - U.S. Taxpayers Party 
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Joe SANGER - U.S. Taxpayers Party 
Scott S. TRUDEAU - Green Party 
 
COUNTY CLERK - 1 - Judy ELLIOTT 
Badi BADIOZAMANI - Independent  
Judy ELLIOTT - Republican 
Diana FOSS - Democratic 
Mike SCHMIER - Democratic 
 
MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERISTY - 
2 
Connie BINSFELD - Republican 
George Scott ROMNEY - Republican 
Dorothy V. GONZALES - Democratic 
Cal RAPSON - Democratic 
Michael H. MILLER - Libertarian 
Violet STEELE - Libertarian 
Robert GALE - U.S. Taxpayers Party 
 
MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF WAYNE STATE UNIVERSITY - 
2 
Michael KELLY - Republican 
Mary Kay SHIELDS - Republican 
Paul MASSARON - Democratic 
Jackie WASHINGTON - Democratic 
Scotty BOMAN - Libertarian 
Thomas W. JONES - Libertarian 
Frederick KLINE - U.S. Taxpayers Party 
Lucretia C. STURDIVANT - U.S. Taxpayers Party 
James J. NICITA - Green Party 
 
COUNTY TREASURER - 1 
Sandra S. THATCHER - Republican 
 
DRAIN COMMISSIONER - 1 
Todd CARSON - Republican 
Rich GOSSE - Republican 
Kenneth W. STRONG - Republican 
 
COUNTY SURVEYOR - 1 
John W. BEARD - Republican 
Joe GUZZARDI - Democratic 
Edward R. REED - Republican 
Lingel H. WINTERS – Democratic 
 
************************************************ 
Election 1 – Error Condition 1 – Error in Bottom of Ballot 
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PRESIDENT - 1 
George BUSH/Dick CHENEY - Republican 
Al GORE/ Joe LIEBERMAN - Democratic 
John HAGELIN/Nat GOLDHABER - Natural Law 
Howard PHILLIPS/J. Curtis FRAZIER - U.S. Taxpayers Party 
Ralph NADER/Winona LaDuke - Green Party 
 
UNITED STATES SENATOR - 1 
Spence ABRAHAM - Republican 
Debbie STABENOW - Democratic 
Mark A. FORTON - Reform 
Michael R. CORLISS - Libertarian 
William QUARTON - Natural Law 
John MANGOPOULOS - U.S. Taxpayers Party 
Matthew R. ABEL - Green Party 
 
STATE REPRESENTATIVE - 1 
Steve VEAR - Republican 
Roy GRIGSBY - Democratic 
 
MEMBER OF THE STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION - 2 
Terri Lynn LAND - Republican 
Lawrence C. PATRICK - Republican 
John AUSTIN - Democratic 
Kathleen STRAUS - Democratic 
Helen E.R. DITZHAZY - Reform 
Mary Ann LESSNER - Reform 
Diane BARNES - Libertarian 
Lynnea ELLISON - Natural Law 
Gail QUARTON - Natural Law 
Clara C. PILCHAK - U.S. Taxpayers Party 
Max RIEKSE - U.S. Taxpayers Party 
 
MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN - 
2 
Wendy ANDERSON - Republican 
Susy AVERY - Republican 
Larry DEITCH - Democratic 
Rebecca McGOWAN - Democratic 
Nick WAUN - Reform 
Tim MAULL - Libertarian 
Marvin SUROWITZ - Libertarian 
Lisa Anne PUCCIO - Natural Law 
David James KNIGHT - U.S. Taxpayers Party 
Joe SANGER - U.S. Taxpayers Party 
Scott S. TRUDEAU - Green Party 
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COUNTY CLERK - 1 
Badi BADIOZAMANI - Independent  
Judy ELLIOTT - Republican 
Diana FOSS - Democratic 
Mike SCHMIER - Democratic 
 
MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERISTY - 
2 
Connie BINSFELD - Republican 
George Scott ROMNEY - Republican 
Dorothy V. GONZALES - Democratic 
Cal RAPSON - Democratic 
Michael H. MILLER - Libertarian 
Violet STEELE - Libertarian 
Robert GALE - U.S. Taxpayers Party 
 
MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF WAYNE STATE UNIVERSITY - 
2 
Michael KELLY - Republican 
Mary Kay SHIELDS - Republican 
Paul MASSARON - Democratic 
Jackie WASHINGTON - Democratic 
Scotty BOMAN - Libertarian 
Thomas W. JONES - Libertarian 
Frederick KLINE - U.S. Taxpayers Party 
Lucretia C. STURDIVANT - U.S. Taxpayers Party 
James J. NICITA - Green Party 
 
COUNTY TREASURER - 1 
Sandra S. THATCHER - Republican 
 
DRAIN COMMISSIONER - 1 
Todd CARSON - Republican 
Rich GOSSE - Republican 
Kenneth W. STRONG - Republican 
 
COUNTY SURVEYOR - 1 - Joe GUZZARDI 
John W. BEARD - Republican 
Joe GUZZARDI - Democratic 
Edward R. REED - Republican 
Lingel H. WINTERS – Democratic 
 
************************************************ 
Election 2 – Error Condition 3 – Error in Top of Ballot 
 
PRESIDENT - 1 - skip 
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George BUSH/Dick CHENEY - Republican 
Al GORE/ Joe LIEBERMAN - Democratic 
John HAGELIN/Nat GOLDHABER - Natural Law 
Howard PHILLIPS/J. Curtis FRAZIER - U.S. Taxpayers Party 
Ralph NADER/Winona LaDuke - Green Party 
 
STATE REPRESENTATIVE - 1 
Steve VEAR - Republican 
Roy GRIGSBY - Democratic 
Helen E.R. DITZHAZY - Reform 
Mary Ann LESSNER - Reform 
Diane BARNES - Libertarian 
 
MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN - 
2 
Wendy ANDERSON - Republican 
Susy AVERY - Republican 
Rebecca McGOWAN - Democratic 
Nick WAUN - Reform 
Tim MAULL - Libertarian 
Marvin SUROWITZ - Libertarian 
Lisa Anne PUCCIO - Natural Law 
David James KNIGHT - U.S. Taxpayers Party 
Joe SANGER - U.S. Taxpayers Party 
Scott S. TRUDEAU - Green Party 
 
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT - 1 
Robert YOUNG - Justice of the Supreme Court 
E.Thomas FITZGERALD -  
Jerry J. KAUFMAN -  
 
MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF WAYNE STATE UNIVERSITY - 
2 
Connie BINSFELD - Republican 
George Scott ROMNEY - Republican 
Dorothy V. GONZALES - Democratic 
Cal RAPSON - Democratic 
Sara Ann HANLON - Independent  
Paul NAVE - Democratic 
Michael H. MILLER - Libertarian 
Violet STEELE - Libertarian 
Robert GALE - U.S. Taxpayers Party 
 
COUNTY CLERK - 1 
Badi BADIOZAMANI - Independent  
Mike SCHMIER - Democratic 
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MEMBER OF THE STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION - 2 
Terri Lynn LAND - Republican 
Lawrence C. PATRICK - Republican 
John AUSTIN - Democratic 
Kathleen STRAUS - Democratic 
Lynnea ELLISON - Natural Law 
Gail QUARTON - Natural Law 
Clara C. PILCHAK - U.S. Taxpayers Party 
Max RIEKSE - U.S. Taxpayers Party 
 
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY - 1 
John W. BEARD - Republican 
Joe GUZZARDI - Democratic 
Edward R. REED - Republican 
Lingel H. WINTERS - Democratic 
 
REGISTER OF DEEDS - 1 
Michael CHELI - Independent 
Linda Lee MORRISON - Republican 
Patricia G. TILLEY - Independent  
 
COUNTY TREASURER - 1 
Sandra S. THATCHER - Republican 
 
COUNTY SURVEYOR - 1 
Bob LYNN EDWARDS - Democratic  
Kirk KASHIAN - Republican 
Judy ELLIOTT - Republican 
Diana FOSS – Democratic 
 
************************************************ 
Election 2 – Error Condition 3 – Error in Middle of Ballot 
 
PRESIDENT - 1  
George BUSH/Dick CHENEY - Republican 
Al GORE/ Joe LIEBERMAN - Democratic 
John HAGELIN/Nat GOLDHABER - Natural Law 
Howard PHILLIPS/J. Curtis FRAZIER - U.S. Taxpayers Party 
Ralph NADER/Winona LaDuke - Green Party 
 
STATE REPRESENTATIVE - 1 
Steve VEAR - Republican 
Roy GRIGSBY - Democratic 
Helen E.R. DITZHAZY - Reform 
Mary Ann LESSNER - Reform 
Diane BARNES - Libertarian 
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MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN - 
2 
Wendy ANDERSON - Republican 
Susy AVERY - Republican 
Rebecca McGOWAN - Democratic 
Nick WAUN - Reform 
Tim MAULL - Libertarian 
Marvin SUROWITZ - Libertarian 
Lisa Anne PUCCIO - Natural Law 
David James KNIGHT - U.S. Taxpayers Party 
Joe SANGER - U.S. Taxpayers Party 
Scott S. TRUDEAU - Green Party 
 
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT - 1 
Robert YOUNG - Justice of the Supreme Court 
E.Thomas FITZGERALD -  
Jerry J. KAUFMAN -  
 
MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF WAYNE STATE UNIVERSITY - 
2 
Connie BINSFELD - Republican 
George Scott ROMNEY - Republican 
Dorothy V. GONZALES - Democratic 
Cal RAPSON - Democratic 
Sara Ann HANLON - Independent  
Paul NAVE - Democratic 
Michael H. MILLER - Libertarian 
Violet STEELE - Libertarian 
Robert GALE - U.S. Taxpayers Party 
 
COUNTY CLERK - 1 - skip 
Badi BADIOZAMANI - Independent  
Mike SCHMIER - Democratic 
 
MEMBER OF THE STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION - 2 
Terri Lynn LAND - Republican 
Lawrence C. PATRICK - Republican 
John AUSTIN - Democratic 
Kathleen STRAUS - Democratic 
Lynnea ELLISON - Natural Law 
Gail QUARTON - Natural Law 
Clara C. PILCHAK - U.S. Taxpayers Party 
Max RIEKSE - U.S. Taxpayers Party 
 
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY - 1 
John W. BEARD - Republican 
Joe GUZZARDI - Democratic 
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Edward R. REED - Republican 
Lingel H. WINTERS - Democratic 
 
REGISTER OF DEEDS - 1 
Michael CHELI - Independent 
Linda Lee MORRISON - Republican 
Patricia G. TILLEY - Independent  
 
COUNTY TREASURER - 1 
Sandra S. THATCHER - Republican 
 
COUNTY SURVEYOR - 1 
Bob LYNN EDWARDS - Democratic  
Kirk KASHIAN - Republican 
Judy ELLIOTT - Republican 
Diana FOSS – Democratic 
 
************************************************ 
Election 2 – Error Condition 3 – Error in Bottom of Ballot 
 
PRESIDENT - 1  
George BUSH/Dick CHENEY - Republican 
Al GORE/ Joe LIEBERMAN - Democratic 
John HAGELIN/Nat GOLDHABER - Natural Law 
Howard PHILLIPS/J. Curtis FRAZIER - U.S. Taxpayers Party 
Ralph NADER/Winona LaDuke - Green Party 
 
STATE REPRESENTATIVE - 1 
Steve VEAR - Republican 
Roy GRIGSBY - Democratic 
Helen E.R. DITZHAZY - Reform 
Mary Ann LESSNER - Reform 
Diane BARNES - Libertarian 
 
MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN - 
2 
Wendy ANDERSON - Republican 
Susy AVERY - Republican 
Rebecca McGOWAN - Democratic 
Nick WAUN - Reform 
Tim MAULL - Libertarian 
Marvin SUROWITZ - Libertarian 
Lisa Anne PUCCIO - Natural Law 
David James KNIGHT - U.S. Taxpayers Party 
Joe SANGER - U.S. Taxpayers Party 
Scott S. TRUDEAU - Green Party 
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JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT - 1 
Robert YOUNG - Justice of the Supreme Court 
E.Thomas FITZGERALD -  
Jerry J. KAUFMAN -  
 
MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF WAYNE STATE UNIVERSITY - 
2 
Connie BINSFELD - Republican 
George Scott ROMNEY - Republican 
Dorothy V. GONZALES - Democratic 
Cal RAPSON - Democratic 
Sara Ann HANLON - Independent  
Paul NAVE - Democratic 
Michael H. MILLER - Libertarian 
Violet STEELE - Libertarian 
Robert GALE - U.S. Taxpayers Party 
 
COUNTY CLERK - 1 
Badi BADIOZAMANI - Independent  
Mike SCHMIER - Democratic 
 
MEMBER OF THE STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION - 2 
Terri Lynn LAND - Republican 
Lawrence C. PATRICK - Republican 
John AUSTIN - Democratic 
Kathleen STRAUS - Democratic 
Lynnea ELLISON - Natural Law 
Gail QUARTON - Natural Law 
Clara C. PILCHAK - U.S. Taxpayers Party 
Max RIEKSE - U.S. Taxpayers Party 
 
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY - 1 
John W. BEARD - Republican 
Joe GUZZARDI - Democratic 
Edward R. REED - Republican 
Lingel H. WINTERS - Democratic 
 
REGISTER OF DEEDS - 1 
Michael CHELI - Independent 
Linda Lee MORRISON - Republican 
Patricia G. TILLEY - Independent  
 
COUNTY TREASURER - 1 - skip 
Sandra S. THATCHER - Republican 
 
COUNTY SURVEYOR - 1 
Bob LYNN EDWARDS - Democratic  
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Kirk KASHIAN - Republican 
Judy ELLIOTT - Republican 
Diana FOSS – Democratic 
 
************************************************ 
Election 3 – Null Error Condition 
 
PRESIDENT - 1 
George BUSH/Dick CHENEY - Republican 
Al GORE/ Joe LIEBERMAN - Democratic 
John HAGELIN/Nat GOLDHABER - Natural Law 
Howard PHILLIPS/J. Curtis FRAZIER - U.S. Taxpayers Party 
Ralph NADER/Winona LaDuke - Green Party 
 
UNITED STATES SENATOR - 1 
Joe Baca - Reform 
David Cobb - Libertarian 
Tim Erickson - Natural Law 
Mike Johnson - Republican 
Carl Mariz - Democratic 
Nicole Parra - U.S. Taxpayers Party 
Lois Wolk - Green Party 
 
SUPERVISOR - 1 
John R. KOPACZ - Republican 
Heather PETERS - Republican 
 
CLERK - 1 
Garreth L. BARKER - Republican 
Paul L. MALONEY -  
Bill MURPHY -  
 
TREASURER - 1 
Cheryl BLY CHESTER - Republican 
 
TRUSTEES - 2 
Mary G. DANIELS - Republican 
Ralph A. HERNANDEZ - Democratic 
Jerry KUNZMAN - Independent 
Donald E. ROGERS - Republican 
Jamie Rosemary SAFFORD - Republican  
Paul W. VANN - Republican 
 
JUDGE OF THE PROBATE COURT - 1 
Frederick L. WOOD - Judge of the Probate Court 
Peggy KNISELY - Republican 
Bryan QUINN - Republican 
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C.T. WEBER - Peace and Freedom  
 
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT (8 Year Term) - 1 
Clifford W. TAYLOR - Justice of the Supreme Court 
Marietta Sebree ROBINSON -  
Robert W. RODDIS -  
 
JUSTICE OF THE District COURT - 1 
Edward McCall THOMAS -   
Stephen J. MARKMAN - Justice of the Supreme Court 
David H. RAAFLAUB -  
 
3rd DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS (6 Year Term ) - 3 
Janet T. NEFF - Judge of the Appeals Court 
Michael R. SMOLENSKI - Judge of the Appeals Court 
Scott A. MEDNICK - Democratic 
 
 
Zoning Board of Appeals - 2 
Michael KELLY - Republican 
Mary Kay SHIELDS - Republican 
Paul MASSARON - Democratic 
Jackie WASHINGTON - Democratic 
Scotty BOMAN - Libertarian 
Thomas W. JONES - Libertarian 
Frederick KLINE - U.S. Taxpayers Party 
Lucretia C. STURDIVANT - U.S. Taxpayers Party 
 
************************************************ 
Election 4 – Error Condition 2 – Error in Top of Ballot 
 
 
President - 1 
George BUSH/Dick CHENEY - Republican 
Al GORE/ Joe LIEBERMAN - Democratic 
John HAGELIN/Nat GOLDHABER - Natural Law 
Howard PHILLIPS/J. Curtis FRAZIER - U.S. Taxpayers Party 
Ralph NADER/Winona LaDuke - Green Party 
 
United States Senator - 2 - Paul Nave, No Vote 
Adam Iris - Republican 
GARY LEONARD - Republican 
PAUL NAVE - Democratic 
GREGORY RUSSELL - Green Party 
BILL T. SIMON - Republican 
C.T. WEBER - Democratic 
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Prosecuting Attorney - 1 
MIKE MCNEILLY - Republican 
HEATHER PETERS - Republican 
MARC VALDEZ - Democratic 
 
County Clerk - 1 
MAURICE WALKER - Democratic 
NED ROSCOE - Republican 
DARIN PRICE - Democratic 
JONATHAN MILLER - Libertarian 
 
Park Commissioners - 2 
Thomas Benigno - Republican 
Shirley Coly - Democratic 
Jason Gastrich - Republican 
Lincoln Pickard - Libertarian 
 
Gas and Electric Commissioner - 1 
Joe Coto - Democratic 
David Dreier - Republican 
Andrew Felder - Republican 
Keith Gann - Green Party 
Jackie Liu - Republican 
 
Road Superintendent - 1 
Patty Brigs - Democratic 
Dean Garza - Republican 
Tom Lantos - Libertarian 
 
Public Utilities Commission - 2 
Richard Ackerman - Democratic 
Wilma Chan - Democratic 
Bea Foster - Republican 
Jay Lang - Libertarian 
David Redick -  
 
Register of Deeds - 1 
Christine Keedy - Democratic 
Herb Peters - Republican 
Audra Tuma - Republican 
Robert Webber - Libertarian 
 
Electoral Board Members - 3 
Ken Bade - Republican 
Toni Casey - Democratic 
Anna Everett - Republican 
Chris Larkin - Republican 
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Ross Moen - Green Party 
Ray Vega - Democratic 
 
Sheriff - 1 
Eric Carter - Democratic 
Keith Robles - Republican 
Linda Shaw - Democratic 
Fritz Ward – Republican 
 
************************************************ 
Election 4 – Error Condition 2 – Error in Middle of Ballot 
 
President - 1 
George BUSH/Dick CHENEY - Republican 
Al GORE/ Joe LIEBERMAN - Democratic 
John HAGELIN/Nat GOLDHABER - Natural Law 
Howard PHILLIPS/J. Curtis FRAZIER - U.S. Taxpayers Party 
Ralph NADER/Winona LaDuke - Green Party 
 
United States Senator - 2 
Adam Iris - Republican 
GARY LEONARD - Republican 
PAUL NAVE - Democratic 
GREGORY RUSSELL - Green Party 
BILL SIMON - Republican 
C.T. WEBER - Democratic 
 
Prosecuting Attorney - 1 
MIKE MCNEILLY - Republican 
HEATHER PETERS - Republican 
MARC VALDEZ - Democratic 
 
County Clerk - 1 
MAURICE WALKER - Democratic 
NED ROSCOE - Republican 
DARIN PRICE - Democratic 
JONATHAN MILLER - Libertarian 
 
Park Commissioners - 2 - Lincoln Pickard, No Vote 
Thomas M. Benigno - Republican 
Shirley Coly - Democratic 
Jason Gastrich - Republican 
Lincoln Pickard - Libertarian 
 
Gas and Electric Commissioner - 1 
Joe Coto - Democratic 
David Dreier - Republican 
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Andrew Felder - Republican 
Keith Gann - Green Party 
Jackie Liu - Republican 
 
Road Superintendent - 1 
Patty Brigs - Democratic 
Dean Garza - Republican 
Tom Lantos - Libertarian 
 
Public Utilities Commission - 2 
Richard Ackerman - Democratic 
Wilma Chan - Democratic 
Bea Foster - Republican 
Jay Lang - Libertarian 
David Redick -  
 
Register of Deeds - 1 
Christine Keedy - Democratic 
Herb Peters - Republican 
Audra Tuma - Republican 
Robert Webber - Libertarian 
 
Electoral Board Members - 3 
Ken Bade - Republican 
Toni Casey - Democratic 
Anna Everett - Republican 
Chris Larkin - Republican 
Ross Moen - Green Party 
Ray Vega - Democratic 
 
Sheriff - 1 
Eric Carter - Democratic 
Keith Robles - Republican 
Linda Shaw - Democratic 
Fritz Ward – Republican 
 
************************************************ 
Election 4 – Error Condition 2 – Error in Bottom of Ballot 
 
President - 1 
George BUSH/Dick CHENEY - Republican 
Al GORE/ Joe LIEBERMAN - Democratic 
John HAGELIN/Nat GOLDHABER - Natural Law 
Howard PHILLIPS/J. Curtis FRAZIER - U.S. Taxpayers Party 
Ralph NADER/Winona LaDuke - Green Party 
 
United States Senator - 2 
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Adam Iris - Republican 
GARY LEONARD - Republican 
PAUL NAVE - Democratic 
GREGORY RUSSELL - Green Party 
BILL SIMON - Republican 
C.T. WEBER - Democratic 
 
Prosecuting Attorney - 1 
MIKE MCNEILLY - Republican 
HEATHER PETERS - Republican 
MARC VALDEZ - Democratic 
 
County Clerk - 1 
MAURICE WALKER - Democratic 
NED ROSCOE - Republican 
DARIN PRICE - Democratic 
JONATHAN MILLER - Libertarian 
 
Park Commissioners - 2 
Thomas Benigno - Republican 
Shirley Coly - Democratic 
Jason Gastrich - Republican 
Lincoln Pickard - Libertarian 
 
Gas and Electric Commissioner - 1 
Joe Coto - Democratic 
David Dreier - Republican 
Andrew Felder - Republican 
Keith Gann - Green Party 
Jackie Liu - Republican 
 
Road Superintendent - 1 
Patty Brigs - Democratic 
Dean Garza - Republican 
Tom Lantos - Libertarian 
 
Public Utilities Commission - 2 
Richard Ackerman - Democratic 
Wilma Chan - Democratic 
Bea Foster - Republican 
Jay Lang - Libertarian 
David Redick -  
 
Register of Deeds - 1 
Christine Keedy - Democratic 
Herb Peters - Republican 
Audra Tuma - Republican 
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Robert Webber - Libertarian 
 
Electoral Board Members - 3 - Ken Bade, Chris Larkin, No Vote 
Ken Bade - Republican 
Toni L. Casey - Democratic 
Anna Everett - Republican 
Chris Larkin - Republican 
Ross Moen - Green Party 
Ray Vega - Democratic 
 
Sheriff - 1 
Eric Carter - Democratic 
Keith Robles - Republican 
Linda Shaw - Democratic 
Fritz Ward - Republican
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Appendix C: Experiment Election Voting Agendas 
Election 1 
 
PRESIDENT 
John HAGELIN/Nat GOLDHABER - Natural Law 
 
UNITED STATES SENATOR  
John MANGOPOULOS - U.S. Taxpayers Party 
 
STATE REPRESENTATIVE 
Roy GRIGSBY - Democratic 
 
MEMBER OF THE STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION 
Helen E.R. DITZHAZY - Reform 
and a candidate of your choice 
 
MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN 
Larry DEITCH - Democratic 
David James KNIGHT - U.S. Taxpayers Party 
 
COUNTY CLERK 
Mike SCHMIER - Democratic 
 
MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERISTY 
your choice 
 
MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF WAYNE STATE UNIVERSITY 
Mary Kay SHIELDS - Republican 
Lucretia C. STURDIVANT - U.S. Taxpayers Party 
 
COUNTY TREASURER 
Sandra S. THATCHER - Republican 
 
DRAIN COMMISSIONER 
Todd CARSON - Republican 
 
COUNTY SURVEYOR 
Edward R. REED – Republican 
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Election 2 
 
PRESIDENTIAL 
Ralph NADER/Winona LaDuke - Green Party 
 
STATE REPRESENTATIVE 
your choice 
 
MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN 
Rebecca McGOWAN - Democratic 
Joe SANGER - U.S. Taxpayers Party 
 
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT (Partial Term Ending 1/1/03) 
Jerry J. KAUFMAN -  
 
MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF WAYNE STATE UNIVERSITY 
Dorothy V. GONZALES - Democratic 
and a candidate of your choice 
 
COUNTY CLERK 
Badi BADIOZAMANI - Independent  
 
MEMBER OF THE STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION 
Lawrence C. PATRICK - Republican 
Clara C. PILCHAK - U.S. Taxpayers Party 
 
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
Edward R. REED - Republican 
 
REGISTER OF DEEDS 
your choice 
 
COUNTY TREASURER 
skip this race 
 
COUNTY SURVEYOR 
Judy ELLIOTT - Republican 
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Election 3 
 
PRESIDENT 
Howard PHILLIPS/J. Curtis FRAZIER - U.S. Taxpayers Party 
 
UNITED STATES SENATOR 
David Cobb - Libertarian 
 
SUPERVISOR 
Heather PETERS - Republican 
 
CLERK 
your choice 
 
TREASURER 
Cheryl BLY-CHESTER - Republican 
 
TRUSTEES 
Donald E. ROGERS - Republican 
Jamie Rosemary SAFFORD - Republican  
 
JUDGE OF THE PROBATE COURT 
Bryan QUINN - Republican 
 
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT (8 Year Term) 
Marietta Sebree ROBINSON -  
 
JUSTICE OF THE District COURT  
your choice 
 
3rd DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS (6 Year Term ) - 3 
Janet T. NEFF - Judge of the Appeals Court 
Michael R. SMOLENSKI - Judge of the Appeals Court 
Scott A. MEDNICK - Democratic 
 
Zoning Board of Appeals 
Paul MASSARON - Democratic 
Frederick KLINE - U.S. Taxpayers Party 
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Election 4 
 
President 
Al GORE/ Joe LIEBERMAN - Democratic 
 
United States Senator 
PAUL NAVE - Democratic 
BILL SIMON - Republican 
 
Prosecuting Attorney 
your choice 
 
County Clerk  
DARIN PRICE - Democratic 
 
Park Commissioners 
Thomas Benigno - Republican 
Lincoln Pickard - Libertarian 
 
Gas and Electric Commissioner 
skip this race 
 
Road Superintendent 
Tom Lantos - Libertarian 
 
Public Utilities Commission 
Wilma Chan - Democratic 
Jay Lang - Libertarian 
 
Register of Deeds 
Christine Keedy - Democratic 
 
Electoral Board Members 
Ken Bade - Republican 
Toni Casey - Democratic 
Chris Larkin - Republican 
 
Sheriff 
Linda Shaw - Democratic 
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Appendix D: Subject Assignments – Voting Machine order and 
Error Order 
 
Subject 
Number First System Election 1 Election 2 Election 3 Election 4 
1 paper null EC1 T EC2 M EC3 B 
2 audio null EC1 T EC2 M EC3 B 
3 paper null EC1 T EC2 M EC3 B 
4 audio null EC1 T EC2 M EC3 B 
5 paper EC2 M EC3 T EC1 B null 
6 audio null EC3 M EC1 B EC2 T 
7 paper EC1 B EC2 M null EC3 T 
8 paper EC3 M EC1 T EC2 B null 
9 audio EC1 B EC2 M null EC3 T 
10 audio EC2 B EC3 M null EC1 T 
11 audio EC3 B null EC1 M EC2 T 
12 audio EC2 M EC3 T EC1 B null 
13 audio EC1 M EC2 T EC3 B null 
14 audio null EC2 B EC3 T EC1 M 
15 paper null EC3 M EC1 B EC2 T 
16 audio EC3 M EC1 T EC2 B null 
17 audio EC3 B EC1 M null EC2 T 
18 audio EC2 B null EC3 M EC1 T 
19 audio EC3 M EC1 T EC2 B null 
20 audio EC1 B null EC2 M EC3 T 
21 paper EC1 M EC2 T EC3 B null 
22 paper null EC3 M EC1 B EC2 T 
23 paper null EC2 B EC3 T EC1 M 
24 audio null EC2 B EC3 T EC1 M 
25 audio EC2 M EC3 T EC1 B null 
26 paper EC2 B EC3 M null EC1 T 
27 paper EC3 B null EC1 M EC2 T 
28 paper EC3 M EC1 T EC2 B null 
29 paper EC1 M EC2 T EC3 B null 
30 paper null EC2 B EC3 T EC1 M 
31 paper EC2 M EC3 T EC1 B null 
32 audio EC1 M EC2 T EC3 B null 
33 paper EC2 B null EC3 M EC1 T 
34 paper EC3 B EC1 M null EC2 T 
35 paper EC1 B null EC2 M EC3 T 
36 audio null EC3 M EC1 B EC2 T 
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Appendix E: Experiment Surveys 
[Pre Survey – Given before the subject began voting] 
Pre-Survey:        Subject Number: _____ 
 
What is your age? 
 
18 – 20 20 – 22 22 – 30 30 – 40 40 – 60 over 60 
 
 
The voting process is easy 
 
Strongly Agree Agree  Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 
 
 
About how many times have you voted in your life? 
 
0  1-5  5-10  10 – 20 more than 20 
 
 
I have voted with the following voting systems:  (circle all that apply) 
 
Absentee ballot optical scanning system DRE (touch screen)  Other 
   (like a scantron test) 
 
 
 
How many computers do you own? 
 
0 1 2 3 4 or more 
 
 
In the last seven days, I have used a computer:  
 
Not at all 1 – 5 hours 5 – 10 hours   10 – 20 hours  more than 20 hours  
 
 
Circle your highest level of Education: 
 
Less than High School 
High School Diploma  
Some College 
College Degree 
Masters Degree 
Doctoral Degree or Professional Degree 
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[Post Survey #1 – First survey given after subject finished voting on both machines] 
Post Survey #1       Subject Number: _____ 
 
PRINTED VOTING MATERIALS EVALUATION  
 
I took some time to read the printed instruction material in the voting booth. 
 
Agree  Disagree Not Sure 
 
 
The instructions were easy to follow. 
 
Strongly Agree Agree  Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 
 
 
I mostly looked at the pictures on the instructions. 
 
Strongly Agree Agree  Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 
 
 
I mostly read the text on the instructions. 
 
Strongly Agree Agree  Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 
 
 
I found the text and the pictures to be equally helpful at interpreting the instructions. 
 
Strongly Agree Agree  Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 
 
 
Overall, I found the instructions were helpful in completing the voting task. 
 
Strongly Agree Agree  Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 
 
 
I read the poster describing the Audio verification tool. 
 
Agree  Disagree Not Sure 
 
 
 
 
TOUCH SCREEN INTERFACE EVALUATION 
 
I found the interface to be visually attractive. 
 
Strongly Agree Agree  Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 
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It was easy to select candidates. 
 
Strongly Agree Agree  Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 
 
It was easy to unselect candidates. 
 
Strongly Agree Agree  Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 
 
 
It was easy to change my vote. 
 
Strongly Agree Agree  Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 
 
 
I used the side navigation tabs. 
 
Agree   Disagree Not Sure 
 
 
I found the review screen to be visually appealing. 
 
Strongly Agree Agree  Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 
 
 
The review screen was a useful feature of this interface. 
 
Strongly Agree Agree  Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 
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[Post Survey #2 – Evaluation of Printer Trail, given as the second survey if the subject 
voted first on the VVPAT system.  Given as the third survey if the subject voted second 
on the VVPAT system.] 
 
Post Survey # 2 - PRINTER TRAIL EVALUATION   Subject _____ 
 
It was easy to create my printed record. 
 
Strongly Agree Agree  Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 
 
 
It was easy to accept/reject my printed record. 
 
Strongly Agree Agree  Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 
 
 
The printed record was easy to read 
 
Strongly Agree Agree  Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 
 
 
The font size (the size of the text) on the printed record was large enough. 
 
Strongly Agree Agree  Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 
It would have been easier to read the paper record if I could have held it myself. 
 
Strongly Agree Agree  Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 
 
 
I can not touch or take home the paper record because: (please fill in your best guess)  
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
The printed records accurately reflected the selections I had made. 
 
Agree  Disagree Not Sure 
 
 
There were some mistakes in the printed record. 
 
Agree  Disagree Not Sure 
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On average, I believe I looked at the paper record for about __________ seconds before 
pressing the accept/reject button. 
 
0-5 seconds 5–10 seconds      10–15 seconds 15–30 seconds        30+ seconds 
 
 
 
Overall, I enjoyed voting on this system.  (the paper record system) 
 
Strongly Agree Agree  Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 
 
 
Overall, it was easy to vote on this system. (the paper record system) 
 
Strongly Agree Agree  Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 
 
 
 
Any Comments on this system:  
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[Post Survey #3 – Evaluation of Audio Trail, given as the second survey if the subject 
voted first on the VVAATT system.  Given as the third survey if the subject voted second 
on the VVAATT system.] 
 
Post Survey - Audio System Evaluation   Subject Number: _____ 
 
AUDIO EVALUATION 
 
I found it easy to understand the verbal feedback I received from the voting machine. 
 
Strongly Agree Agree  Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 
 
 
The audio verification caused me to take more time when voting. 
 
Strongly Agree Agree  Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 
 
 
The audio verification was pleasant to listen to. 
 
Strongly Agree Agree  Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 
 
The voice of the audio verification was too robotic for my tastes. 
 
Strongly Agree Agree  Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 
 
 
The audio verification helped me confirm the selections I made. 
 
Strongly Agree Agree  Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 
 
 
The audio verification accurately reflected the selections I made. 
 
Agree   Disagree Not Sure 
 
 
There were some mistakes in the audio verification 
 
Agree   Disagree Not Sure 
 
 
When using the audio verification, I noticed mistakes and errors immediately after they 
occurred. 
 
Strongly Agree Agree  Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 
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Everything that I heard in the headphones was recorded on the audio tape. 
 
Agree  Disagree Not Sure 
 
 
The purpose of tape recording the audio verification is: (please make your best guess) 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
If I were voting in a real election, I would feel comfortable with the tape recording. 
 
Strongly Agree Agree  Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 
 
 
 
 
 
Overall, I enjoyed voting on this system.  (the audio verification system) 
 
Strongly Agree Agree  Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 
 
Overall, it was easy to vote on this system. (the audio verification system) 
 
Strongly Agree Agree  Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 
 
 
Any Comments on this system: 
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[Final Survey – the last survey the subject completed.] 
 
Final Survey       Subject Number: _____ 
 
I preferred voting on the _____________ system. 
 
Paper record  Audio Verification  No Preference 
 
 
I found it easier to vote on the _______________ system. 
 
Paper record  Audio Verification  No Preference 
 
 
 
The main objective of the system with the paper record is 
to have a paper record of each vote made during an election 
to serve as an audit form.  In a real election a small 
percentage of the paper records would be hand counted and 
their results verified against the electronic results.  In the 
event of a recount, all the paper records would be hand 
counted. 
 
In a real election, I would place greater trust in the paper records than the electronic 
records. 
 
Strongly Agree Agree  Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 
 
 
In a real election, I would feel confident of the results of an election if my county used a 
voting system with a paper record trail. 
 
Strongly Agree Agree  Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 
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The main objective of the audio verification system is to 
create an audio record of each vote that would serve as an 
audit.  In a real election, a small percentage of the audio 
records would be listened to and counted and the results 
would be verified against the electronic results.  In the 
event of a recount, all the audio records would be counted.  
 
In a real election, I would place greater trust in the audio records than the electronic 
records. 
 
Strongly Agree Agree  Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 
 
 
In a real election, I would feel confident of the results of an election if my county used a 
voting system with an audio record trail. 
 
Strongly Agree Agree  Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 
 
In a real election, I would feel confident of the results of an election if my county did not 
have any audit mechanism.  (The electronic records were the only records of the votes.) 
 
Strongly Agree Agree  Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 
 
 
I would feel most confident in the results of an election when my county used a voting 
system with a _______________ audit system. 
 
Paper records   Audio records   No audit system 
 
